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ABSTRACT 
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons delivers a global supply of 
weapons and ammunition to the demand of rogue state and non-state actors. While arms 
do not create conflict, they increase the intensity of violent conflict. The illicit trafficking 
of small arms contributes to irregular conflicts in the Middle East, a region of persistent 
conflict and instability. The international community has attempted to regulate the global 
supply of small arms through non-binding agreement and embargoes, but these efforts 
have been ineffective in achieving the goal of preventing the flow of weapons to criminal 
organizations, terrorists, and other de-stabilizing non-state actors. This thesis 
systematically examines the illicit small arms trade to identify points of vulnerability. 
This study identifies a strategy to disrupt the flow of arms to specific groups or states by 
countering arms brokers and the networks of actors that brokers coordinate.  
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There is a contemporary myopic focus on the strategies of insurgency, terrorism, 
and transnational non-state actors. Accompanying this focus is a general lack of interest 
in the relatively old instruments of violent conflict: small arms. Organized human 
violence is conducted with small arms and the old adage remains true “Guns don’t kill 
people, people kill people.” Nonetheless, the intensity of violent conflict relates to the 
instruments and strategies employed. Small arms are the instruments used by the U.S. 
adversaries in low intensity conflicts around the world. 
Arms broker Viktor Bout has been arming the U.S.’s adversaries for almost 
twenty years. The U.S. Department of Treasury sanctioned Mr. Bout in 2005 for critical 
role in the arming of Charles Taylor’s regime in Liberia and the Revolutionary Armed 
Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone.1 In the 1990s, Mr. Bout coordinated delivery of arms to 
countries throughout Africa including Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.2 Mr. Bout successfully circumvented UN 
embargoes to each of these countries, and as a result was able to arm violent factions 
actively engaged in internal warfare. Mr. Bout profited by over $50 million for arms sales 
and deliveries to the Taliban in Afghanistan in the late 1990s.3 Despite the fact that Mr. 
Bout armed the failed regime that harbored Al Qaeda before the deadly “9/11” attacks in 
2001, the U.S. has failed to prevent Mr. Bout from continuing to operate and profit from 
illicit small arms sales. From 2003 to 2004, the U.S. Department of Defense unwittingly 
outsourced logistics contracts to Mr. Bout’s companies in support of operations in Iraq.4 
                                                 
1  “Treasury Designates Viktor Bout’s International Arms Trafficking Network,” U.S. Treasury 
Department Press Release, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js2406.htm (accessed July 22, 2007). 
2  Ibid. 
3  Matthew Brunwasser, “The Embargo Buster: Fueling Bloody Civil Wars,” PBS Frontline -World, 
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sierraleone/bout.html (accessed January 31, 2008). 
4  Michael Isikoff, “Iraq: Government Deal with a ‘Merchant of Death’?” Newsweek, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6700301/site/ (accessed July 22, 2007). 
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Viktor Bout is the personification of Joseph Heller’s character Milo Minderbinder, the 
illicit entrepreneur who armed both sides of the conflict to stir up business in Catch 22.5 
In 2007, Bout coordinated aerial delivery of weapons to Somalia’s Union of Islamic 
Courts, another UN-embargoed failed state.6 
Mr. Bout is a global entrepreneur that typifies the modern illicit arms broker.7 
Bout’s market-maker activities, the suppliers that provided vast stocks of small arms and 
light weapons, and the end users who demanded the weapons constitute the economic 
system that is the illicit small arms trade. Moreover, Bout’s case exemplifies the linkages 
between illicit markets (weapons, drugs, and financial) and internal conflicts. Eventually, 
in March 2008, Thai police arrested Mr. Bout in Bangkok on charges of attempted sales 
of small arms to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC).8 Bout’s FARC 
operation allegedly consisted of a drugs-for-guns arrangement – a typical illicit 
commodity transaction. The Thai police were able to track and arrest Bout because of 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency intelligence efforts. 
Bout’s extra-legal operations relied upon his ability to avoid detection, regulation, 
and prosecution. Bout’s activities beg the question: why does the U.S. allow illicit arms 
brokers to arm our adversaries? What is the scope, structure, and impact of illicit arms 
sales? Why has the international community failed to disrupt this global network of arms 
traffickers? How can the U.S. prevent arms brokers from arming our adversaries? 
1. The Strategic Relevance of the Illicit Small Arms Trade 
Existing literature on the impact of small arms focuses on the human toll of 
violent crime and conflict. Ultimately, violent crime and internal conflict has limited 
strategic relevance to the U.S. when these irregular conflicts are viewed solely as human 
                                                 
5 Joseph Heller, Catch 22 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 
6  Jon Swain and Brian Johnson-Thomas, “Exposed: The Somalia Arms Boycott Breaker,” Times 
Online, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2076015.ece?print=yes## (accessed 
January 31, 2008). 
7 For a detailed narrative of Viktor Bout’s activities see Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun, Merchant 
of Death. Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2007. 
8  Seth Mydans and Raymond Bonner, “Major Arms Dealer Arrested in Thailand,” The New York 
Times, March 6, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com (accessed March 6, 2008). 
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rights problems. The absence of U.S. intervention in violent internal conflicts in African 
states underscores the difference between our moral concern for human death and real 
national interest. However, for real security considerations, the illicit trade in small arms 
is a potential national security issue for the near future.  
For a variety of reasons, the illicit small arms trade is a strategically relevant 
problem for the United States. The two primary reasons are the ability of illicit traffickers 
to arm our adversaries and the potentially destabilizing effects of violent internal 
conflicts. First, the trade has the capacity to rapidly create new power asymmetries. The 
existing global supply consists of over 500 million small arms and light weapons 
circulating in over 70 countries.9 The annual small arms trade is valued at $4 billion, with 
the illicit small arms trade constituting between ten and twenty percent of the legal trade 
– thus amounting to a $1 billion illicit global industry.10 Given the vast quantity of small 
arms in circulation and the ability to meet demand globally, the illicit trade has the 
capacity to alter the coercive capability of organized groups. Illicit arms transfers 
empower armed groups. For example, Viktor Bout’s brokering and transport activities 
armed the Taliban prior to U.S. combat action in Afghanistan. 
Secondly, because the illicit trade circumvents or breaks national laws, it is a 
challenge to state legitimacy where it occurs. Internal wars have become the predominant 
form of violent conflict since World War II and have produced five times more casualties 
than interstate war during this period.11 Violent internal conflict of this type includes civil 
war, insurgency, sectarian conflict, ethnic conflict, terrorism, genocide, and irregular 
wars. These internal conflicts predominantly occur in developing countries where simple 
access and availability of small arms has an undeniably destabilizing effect.12 The 
                                                 
9  United Nations, Small Arms United Nations [1999]), 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/242/48/PDF/N9924248.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 
January 31, 2008). 
10  N. Marsh, “Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Legal and Illegal Trade in Small Arms,” The Brown 
Journal of World Affairs IX, no. 1 (2002), 220. 
11  James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003), 75-90. 
12  Ibid., 88. 
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availability and distribution of small arms affects the capacity of violent groups 
(terrorists, criminal organizations, and other non-state actors) to engage in violent 
conflict. Irregular forces and militias conduct internal conflicts, as opposed to well-
organized and resource-enabled professional militaries. These forces have limited 
resources and structure, causing a dependence of cheap and ubiquitous small arms.13 
From 1998 until 2005, over 66 percent of arms transfers went to developing 
countries.14 The UN has already concluded that illicit small arms transfers directly 
contribute to increased incidence of internal violent conflict.15 Small arms currently 
account for 90% of combat-related casualties.16 These weapons provide individuals and 
organized groups of non-state actors the tools to increase the intensity of violent internal 
conflict. “Small arms and light weapons destabilize regions; spark, fuel and prolong 
conflicts; obstruct relief programmes [sic]; undermine peace initiatives; exacerbate 
human rights abuses; hamper development; and foster a ‘culture of violence’”.17 In short, 
arms trafficking is associated with changing the power dynamics in developing countries 
or other fragile areas. U.S. foreign policy interests are frequently associated with 
developing nations, including access to resources such as oil or security conditions that 
facilitate trans-national terrorism. Thus, as the small arms trade affects our national 
interests abroad, the U.S. must fully understand the impacts of small arms and assess the 
nation’s ability to disrupt the illicit small arms trade. 
                                                 
13  Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael Klare, “Introduction” In Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: 
Controlling the Tools of Violence, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael Klare (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 3. 
14  Richard Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005, Congressional 
Research Service [2006]), Naval Postgraduate School BOSUN Database (accessed July 22, 2007). 
15  United Nations, Small Arms, 7. 
16  Lora Lumpe, ed., Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms (London: Zed, 2000), 
vii. 
17  United Nations, “United Nations Small Arms and Light Weapons Website,” United Nations, 
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/salw.html (accessed January 31, 2008). 
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2. The Strategic Relevance of the Middle East 
At present, U.S. national interests depend to a very considerable degree on the 
conditions in of the Middle East. The Middle East, with the end of the cold war, is 
arguably the most tumultuous region on earth. The U.S. military is currently conducting 
operations in a variety of locations in the Middle East, most notably in Iraq and on the 
fringes in areas such as the Horn of Africa (HOA) and Afghanistan. Moreover, the U.S. 
has strategic interests throughout the region such as access to oil and security in Israel. In 
this light, protecting U.S. interests include regional stability and the stability of key 
Middle Eastern states. To the extent that the absence of violent internal conflict is an 
indicator of stability, focusing on the “tools” of violent conflict is clearly relevant to U.S. 
interests. 
The current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the U.S. national security 
strategy relies upon defeating and preventing the spread of violent, radical Islamic 
ideology in the region.18 There is a compelling argument that protecting U.S. interests 
requires addressing the root causes or conditions that result in the spread of terrorist 
ideologies. Biddle argues that pursuing internal stability in the Middle East is the best 
path to the mitigation of the root causes of terrorism19. In the Middle East, addressing 
these conditions implies promoting stability and good governance. This logic indicates 
that focusing on the root causes of terrorism or instability is more important than focusing 
on the instrumental aspects of violence (i.e., counter the tactics of terrorism or reducing 
availability of arms). The logic is shortsighted in that the very ubiquity and lethality of 
small arms are themselves at the root of the climate of violence. As Laurance points out, 
it is extremely difficult to address or fix the root causes of conflict.20 Small arms are both 
essential instruments of conflict and symbols of conflict. “While it cannot be said that 
                                                 
18  United States Department of Defense, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, 
United States Department of Defense [2006]. 
19  Stephen D. Biddle, American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment, [2003], 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi (accessed January 15, 2007). 
20  Edward Laurance, Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventative 
Action (New York: Carnegie [1998]), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/weap/frame.htm 
(accessed January 15, 2007). 
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such weapons are a primary cause of conflict, their worldwide availability, low cost, and 
ease of operation make it relatively easy for potential belligerents of all kinds to initiate 
and sustain deadly conflicts.”21 Thus, addressing small arms as instrumental tools of 
internal instability may constitute an approach to pursuing the U.S. objective of regional 
stability – given an inability to mitigate effectively the root causes of instability in the 
short term.  
The underlying concept or assumption of this study is recognition that the U.S. 
faces a broad variety of threats and operates with constrained resources - necessitating 
efficient allocation of national resources. As the U.S. assesses how to address the wars of 
globalization (such as transnational terrorism, the illicit arms trade, the drug trade, 
etc…),22 a thorough understanding of the problems and potential for successful counter-
actions is required before committing valuable resources. The U.S. is currently fighting 
the Global War on Terror and has been involved in the Drug War for approaching four 
decades, initiatives that consume immense resources. This study intends to shed light on 
the more efficient use of resources and to identify appropriate strategies. 
3. Current Approaches 
When framed as an instrumental problem of intra-state conflict, the study of the 
illicit small arms trade has resulted in proposals to strengthen market regulation. A 
review of current research identifies a consensus that the illicit arms market requires 
regulation by a “multilayered regime” of international (global), regional, national, and 
local market controls.23 Boutwell and Klare identify seven key steps to regulating the 
arms trade to prevent illicit transfers: establish international norms against uncontrolled 
and destabilizing transfers, increase the “transparency” of the arms trade, increase 
government accountability for exports, increase international and regional oversight, 
                                                 
21  Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael Klare, “Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Policy Options for the 
International Community” In Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence, eds. 
Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael Klare (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 217. 
22  M. Naim, “The Five Wars of Globalization,” Foreign Policy 134 (2003), 29. 
23  Boutwell and Klare, Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Policy Options for the International 
Community, 221. 
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reduce stockpiles, conduct post-conflict disarmament, and international “capacity 
building” (encouragement of new controls in weakly regulated states).24 Laurance’s Light 
Weapons and Intrastate Conflict reflects this approach: a legalistic attempt to prevent the 
transfer of small arms.25 The core of the illicit small arms problem, which Chapter 2 of 
this thesis develops fully, is an uncontrolled and unreported transfer mechanism. The 
underlying assumption of the regulatory approach is that regulation will result in fully 
transparent small arms transfers and easy identification of illegal transfers when they 
occur. Regulations may have a limited ability to control markets when suppliers, brokers, 
and end-users collude in networked processes beyond regulatory control. Chapter 4 
explores how effective regulatory measures can disrupt the illicit small arms trade.  
When viewed as a traditional market, there are two basic approaches to 
addressing the illicit small arms trade: manipulation of demand or regulation of the 
supply. There are currently no systematic efforts to address demand for weapons, 
although a fledgling non-governmental organization exists with a stated purpose to 
reduce individual demand for weapons in Arab states.26 Existing solutions to the illicit 
small arms trade primarily take the form of supply-side controls and attempts to regulate 
brokering activities. As stated previously, affecting the illicit small arms trade through 
policy or other means is instrumental in nature, as opposed to strategies aimed at 
addressing the root causes of conflicts.27 Despite the existence of numerous non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and the frequent occurrence of international 
conferences on the small arms problem, there are currently “no legally binding 
                                                 
24 Boutwell and Klare, Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Policy Options for the International 
Community, 222-228. 
25 Laurance, Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventative Action, 
62-62. 
26  American Friends Service Committee and Regional Human Center, Traditional Cultural Practices 
and Small Arms in the Middle East: Problems and Solutions (Amman, Jordan: The Regional Human 
Security Center at The Jordan Institute for Diplomacy, [2002]), 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/country/nafr_pdf/mideast-yem-leb-jor-eg-pal-
2002.pdf (accessed August 28, 2008). 
27 Laurance, Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventative Action, 
10. 
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international treaties governing how legal arms transfers should be conducted.”28 As will 
be explored further, there are few legal measures prohibiting arms transfers. Efforts to 
control the international transfer of small arms are relatively new, largely a product of 
post-Cold War instability in the 1990s.  
Laurance provides a typology of existing efforts to combat illicit arms trafficking, 
which primarily consist of international, regional, and national regulatory agreements. 
International measures, with the notable exception of UN embargoes, are typified by non-
binding agreements that ultimately depend on national laws.29 The dominant international 
framework for affecting the small arms problem is the “UN Programme of Action to 
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons In All 
Its Aspects (UNPOA), as agreed upon by the majority of UN member states in 2001.30 
This non-binding agreement seeks the development of national, regional, and global 
measures to prevent illicit trafficking of small arms.31 The UNPOA relies upon member 
states to cooperate in order to establish and enforce regulations.32 This mechanism is a 
“name and shame” strategy.33 The UN and a variety associated NGOs constantly research 
occurrences of violent conflict that are attributed to illicit arms transfers. The UN 
identifies countries with failing national regulatory and enforcement practices and 
attempts to influence these states to strengthen national controls. 
Most importantly, the UNPOA defines the problem and provides a forum for 
international cooperation. In this regard, note that this analysis utilizes the UN’s well-
recognized definitions for small arms, which defines small arms as weapons designed for 
                                                 
28 Marsh, Two Sides of the Same Coin? the Legal and Illegal Trade in Small Arms, 217. 
29  Ibid., 219. 
30  Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006: Assessing the First Five Years of the UN Programme of 
Action, International Action Network on Small Arms,[2006]), http://www.international-
alert.org/publications/249.php (accessed January 28, 2008). 
31  United Nations, Small Arms and Light Weapons: Selected United Nations Documents (Geneva: 
United Nations, [2005]), http://disarmament.un.org/cab/images/bookletsalw2005.PDF (accessed February 
5, 2008). 
32  Ibid. 
33  Brunwasser, The Embargo Buster: Fueling Bloody Civil Wars. 
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personal use and light weapons as weapons designed for use by a crew. Small arms 
include revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, and light 
machine guns. Light weapons include machine-guns, mortars, hand grenades, grenade 
launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, and portable missile launchers.34 The UN’s 
definition extends to associated ammunition and parts. Most importantly, the UN panel of 
experts designed the definition with intent to include weapons most commonly used in 
intra-state conflict.35 
Beyond the UN’s international efforts, there are similar regional regulatory 
frameworks that focus on regulating supply. It is important to note that the Middle East 
lacks any regional inter-government agreements or frameworks. However, Middle 
Eastern states’ participation in the 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms indicated a 
coordinated policy against international regulation on arms transfers and brokering.36 
Non-governmental organizations in the Middle East have conducted regional 
conferences, but there are no actual coordinated efforts at the regional level. 
 4. U.S. Policy 
Current U.S. policy is that “illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons 
poses the greatest threat to regional security in less-developed areas of the word.”37 U.S. 
policy is primarily regulatory in nature and relies on diplomacy for implementation. The 




                                                 
34  United Nations, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, United Nations, 
[1997]), http://disarmament.un.org/CAB/smallarms/docs/rep52298.pdf (accessed April 11, 2008). 
35 Ibid. and Laurance, Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventative 
Action, 17. 
36  Edward Laurance and Rachel Stohl, Making Global Public Policy: The Case of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons (Geneva: Small Arms Survey [2002]). 
37  Richard Grimmett, International Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers: U.S. Policy, 
Congressional Research Service [2006]), Naval Postgraduate School BOSUN Database (accessed July 20, 
2007). 
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encourage nation-states to strengthen and enforce existing national regulations on small 
arms. U.S. laws regarding the licensing and export of small arms are among the most 
restrictive in the world.38  
The four-pronged U.S. policy is: 
1. Attempt to curb black market transfers of small arms to zones of conflict, 
terrorists, criminal organizations, and drug traffickers 
2. Attempt to raise the arms export standards of other nations to U.S. standards 
3. Strengthen U.S. export procedures to improve accountability without 
interfering with the legal trade in and transfer of arms [emphasis added] 
4. Support destruction of excess small arms.39 
The U.S. policy focuses on the supply side of the arms trade and does not directly 
address weapons demand or brokering activities. Moreover, the U.S. is actively engaged 
in the legal arms trade - an enormously lucrative business for the United States. In 2005, 
the U.S. transferred arms valued at $6 billion to developing nations. These transfers 
constituted twenty percent of total global transfers to the developing world – a $30 billion 
industry.40 In doing so, the U.S. is a willing partner in the illegal arms trade. As will be 
examined in Chapter II, legal arms trades often become illicit through secondary transfers 
or diversion to unintended users.41 Thus, the U.S. may have competing interests between 
the U.S.’ need to participate in the global small arms market as “foreign policy writ 
large,” and the need to prevent the arms trade from empowering our adversaries. Lastly, 
the U.S. does not have a current region-specific policy for small arms in the Middle East. 
Thus, the illicit small arms trade requires a nuanced and careful U.S. policy and further 
examination for region-specific concerns. 
                                                 
38  Grimmett, International Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers: U.S. Policy. 
39  Ibid. 
40  Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005, 21. 
41  Tamara Makarenko, “Tracing the Dynamics of the Illicit Arms Trade,” Jane’s Information Group, 
http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?Prod_Name=JIR&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=tra
cing the dynamics of the illicit arms 




The purpose of this study is to evaluate the illicit small arms trade and to identify 
conditions in which the U.S. could successfully disrupt the trade in the Middle East. The 
illicit arms trade, as an economic system, is one of the five wars of globalization: the 
illegal trades of arms, drugs, people, money, and intellectual property.42 As the U.S. 
Department of Defense determines its role and strategy in countering these potential 
national security threats, a thorough feasibility assessment of disrupting the trade is 
necessary. A thorough understanding of these problems of globalization is essential to 
appropriately shaping defense and security policy for the future. Current U.S. policy on 
the illicit arms trade dates to the early 1990s and primarily relies on encouraging other 
nations to strengthen and enforce national small arms trafficking laws.43 This thesis 
explores the range of options available to the U.S. and identifies conditions under which 
the U.S.’s can successfully disrupt the small arms trade in the Middle East. The 
conditions identified in this thesis will enhance the U.S.’ ability to effectively disrupt the 
illicit small arms and light weapons trade in a limited geo-political area through a 
combination of policy, information operations, and special operations interdiction.  
This research provides background and understanding that is essential to the 
development of operational methods for countering the illicit arms trade. The DOD 
identifies arms trafficking as a specific mission in joint, Army, and special operations 
doctrine. First, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, defines countering illicit arms 
trafficking as a peacetime mission for combatant commanders.44 This represents a 
significant step forward from the previous version of FM 3-0, which merely places arms 
trafficking in the description of existing transnational threats.45 Secondly, the Joint 
Operating Concept for Irregular Warfare includes illicit arms trafficking in a typology of 
                                                 
42  Naim, The Five Wars of Globalization, 29. 
43  Grimmett, International Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers: U.S. Policy, 2-3. 
44  United States Department of Defense, United States Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations, [2008]), 
http://www.army.mil/fm3-0.pdf. (accessed March 4, 2008). 
45  United States Department of Defense, United States Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations, [2001]), 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_0a.pdf (accessed March 4, 2008). 
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irregular warfare activities. This joint concept, which intends to provide vision for future 
joint operations, clearly identifies a need for operational methods to counter arms 
trafficking.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
This research consists of several parts. Chapter II provides a systematic analysis 
of the illicit small arms trade:  supply, demand, brokering, and Middle Eastern/Region-
specific conditions. This section is a synthesis of the best contemporary analysis of the 
illicit small arms trade. I will present both the market and network characteristics of the 
arms trade. Chapter III examines demand and supply of small arms in the Middle East, 
identifying how these conditions affect potential disruption strategies. Chapter IV 
evaluates three different options for disrupting arms trafficking: regulation, counter-
demand, and counter-brokering. This study also examines the conditions that lead to the 
success or failure of the disruption options. Chapter V develops the counter-brokering 
strategy by identifying appropriate ends, ways, and means for disrupting arms trafficking. 




II. THE ILLICIT SMALL ARMS TRADE 
A. BOUNDING THE PROBLEM 
The arms trade is a lucrative and complicated business. The market functions to 
transfer enormous quantities of arms between suppliers and users around the globe. This 
chapter presents a simple model of how this illicit global trade functions, starting by 
presenting a typology of the arms trade (legal, gray, black, and unregulated transfers). 
Next, I evaluate the illicit small arms trade as a market with the key dimensions of 
supply, demand, and brokering. Last, I reveal the illicit arms market as a network – a 
perspective that expands upon the market view of the arms trade. There are numerous, 
lengthy publications that deconstruct the arms trade in detail – this chapter will not 
attempt that. The purpose of this chapter is to develop a broad picture of the illicit arms 
trade, as applicable to sub-state warfare and the Middle East.  
Small or internal wars have risen in significance since World War II.46 These 
internal wars are not fought in a vacuum: the international community influences these 
internal conflicts through strategies of support or isolation of the actors involved. Along 
with people and money, arms are an active ingredient in the recipe for violent conflict. 
Irregular forces such as guerrillas or insurgents typically fight internal wars as organized 
groups. The flow of arms to groups, particularly clandestine transfers, has the capacity to 
shift the military power balance in areas of interest. As a result, this analysis is concerned 
with disruption of arms flows to organized groups (state or non-state) – as opposed to 
removal of the source of supply. While there are arguments for limiting production and/or 
destruction of weapons supplies, the concern here is for the mechanisms that deliver arms 
from producer-suppliers to groups in conflict zones. Groups fight internal wars over 
political control of territory, which necessitates organizing and arming for the task. This 
 
 
                                                 
46  James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003), 75. 
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work looks at group or collective demand for weapons, the aspect relevant to the arming 
of groups for internal conflict. These considerations, while limiting in nature, focus the 
following assessment of the illicit arms trade. 
The illicit small arms trade is by necessity a clandestine activity. This research 
relies on open source information that is freely available in the public domain. 
Consequently, there is a significant gap between the information available and the 
information necessary for a complete model of the illicit arms trade. Several constraints 
limit possession of complete knowledge of the trade’s structure. First, most available 
information will be somewhat “dated” and will only reveal portions of the trade. I accept 
available information as representative of the entire trade. Secondly, because most recent 
research focuses on the Cold War or the internecine conflicts of Africa, there is limited 
information available specific to other times and regions. To proceed, I make the 
assumption that the trade function (specifically, the role of arms brokers and the varied 
means of arms transfer) is not region-specific – i.e., illicit arms trades basically happen 
the same way in the Middle East as they do in Africa. 
B.  THE ILLICIT ARMS TRADE 
This section presents the illicit small arms trade as a market consisting of supply, 
demand, and brokering. The purpose of this section is to distinguish between illegal and 
legal trade and to distinguish between transnational (or inter-state) transfers and intrastate 
transfers. This differentiation is essential to understanding the function of the illicit small 
arms market. 
1. Defining Legal and Illegal Trade 
The arms market consists of two broad categories: legal and illegal trade. The 
distinction is simple at the conceptual or policy-level.47 Legal trades represent overt 
foreign policy: either empowering an ally through trade or denying capability to an 
adversary in the absence of trade. In contrast, illicit trades occur without state or 
                                                 
47  Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, “What’s Legal? What’s Illegal?” In Running Guns: The Global Black 
Market in Small Arms, ed. Lora Lumpe (New York: Zed, 2000), 27. 
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international control - the defining characteristic of the illicit trade in small arms. 
International, regional, and national laws govern the arms trade. These legal restrictions 
drive the methods that arms traffickers use to move illicit small arms. Though the laws 
are complicated, a brief review suffices to demonstrate how the laws drive the methods of 
the arms trade. The system of laws, and the lack of uniformity across the international 
system, force arms traders to conduct fraud (e.g., document falsification), to use 
intermediaries, or to use a combination of these tactics, in order to hide the intent to 
transfer arms to banned end-users such as embargoed states or terrorists. In short, the 
system of laws necessitates the methods used to transfer weapons.48 
International law pertaining to the arms trade consists of compliance-based and 
end use--based laws. Compliance-based laws reflect state obligations to signed 
international treaties or to binding UN embargoes. This category consists of prohibition 
of specific kinds of arms transfers, e.g., transfers to embargoed states or terrorist groups. 
Both treaties and UN embargoes still require national legislation and enforcement. 
Compliance-based laws generally take the form of licensing for individual transfers, thus 
enabling the state to validate individual transfers against explicit obligations. Ends-based 
laws reflect international norms for the use of weapons, such the prohibitions against 
arms sales for use in genocide, human rights violations, and terrorism.49 This category 
also includes respect for state sovereignty under the UN Charter. UN members have an 
obligation not to transfer weapons for aggressive use by another state or to provide 
weapons that affects the internal security of sovereign states. Ends-based laws develop in 
the form of state review of the end-users. All international law is ultimately dependent 
upon individual states to enact and enforce regulatory laws.  
                                                 
48 Many sources substantiate the claim that laws necessitate the methods used to circumvent them. See 
BASIC, Controlling Arms Brokering and Transport Agents, [2001]), http://www.nisat.org (accessed 
January 15, 2008). 
49  Gillard, What’s Legal? What’s Illegal? 37-40. 
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International Law Compliance Based Ends-Based 
Binding (Explicit) Concluded Treaties  UN-imposed Embargoes:  
UNSCRs under Chapter VII 
Genocide 
Terrorism 
International Humanitarian Law 
Non-Binding UN General Assembly Resolutions International “Customary Law” 
International or Regional Agreements: 
UN Programme of Action 
ECOWAS Moratorium 
EU Code of Conduct 
UN Charter - State’s Sovereign Rights 
UN General Assembly Resolutions 
Table 1.   International Law 
 
In response to the state-centric nature of these international laws, several 
international organizations and voluntary agreements have emerged to encourage state 
regulation of arms production and export. These include the Wassenaar Arrangement (a 
group of 33 arms exporting states that have agreed to a set of arms export standards to 
ensure transparency)50 and the 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and 
Eradicate the Illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, In All Its Aspects 
(UNPOA).51 In addition to these international-global measures, there are several regional 
agreements – most of which are regional efforts to implement the UNPOA. The Middle 
East lacks any formal or informal regional control measures.52 A subsequent section 
assesses the effectiveness of these regulations in detail. 
National laws regulate production, import, and export of small arms. Generally, 
these laws take the form of licensing requirements: licensing of production, licensing for 
export or import, and licensing for brokering (for a small number of states). National 
laws, which reflect international norms for compliance and ends, represent an attempt to 
regulate the arms market.  
                                                 
50  Laurance, Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventative Action. 
51  United Nations, Small Arms and Light Weapons: Selected United Nations Documents (Geneva: 
United Nations, [2005]), http://disarmament.un.org/cab/images/bookletsalw2005.PDF (accessed February 
5, 2008). 
52  Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006: Assessing the First Five Years of the UN Programme of 
Action International Action Network on Small Arms,[2006]), http://www.international-
alert.org/publications/249.php (accessed January 28, 2008). and Edward Laurance and Rachel Stohl, 
Making Global Public Policy: The Case of Small Arms and Light Weapons (Geneva: Small Arms 
Survey,[2002]). 
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In the global small arms market, there are key weaknesses to the current system of 
laws. First, international law is applicable to states and inapplicable to non-state actors 
(NSAs).53 The international community has been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of 
power and influence of non-state actors and non-state actors can use this inadequate 
adaptation as a strategic opportunity.54 In the absence of applicable national laws (either 
compliance or ends-based), there are no restrictions on private arms exporters. Secondly, 
national laws are not uniform across the international community. While a state may have 
strict national laws and enforcement mechanisms to thwart inappropriate transfers, many 
states lack national laws or enforcement mechanisms. These un-regulated or under-
regulated countries can serve as key exporters or intermediaries in the arms transfer 
system.  
2.  Gray and Black Markets 
The preceding distinctions between legal and illegal trade is the entry point to a 
more detailed model of illicit weapons flows. Legal trades occur with either the active or 
passive involvement of governments or their authorized agents, and in accordance with 
both national and international law.55 The first category of illicit transfer is the gray 
market. This category has two practical meanings. First, gray transfers consist of states or 
non-state actors who exploit loopholes or intentionally circumvent laws – thus, these 
transfers are not explicitly illegal.56 These trades include overt trades in circumvention of 
the law. Secondly, gray transfers consist of covert transfers from states to states or to 
non-state organizations. These transfers are gray by virtue of being covert and clandestine 
– hidden from public scrutiny. Government-sanctioned gray transfers are “not explicitly 
illegal,” but covert transfer implies circumvention of established laws and norms for the 
                                                 
53  Gillard, What’s Legal? What’s Illegal? 29. 
54  Neil Pollard, “Globalization’s Bastards: Illegitimate Non-State Actors in International Law.” In 
Networks, Terrorism, and Global Insurgency, edited by Robert Bunker, 40-68. New York: Routledge, 
2005. 
55  Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 167. 
56  Ibid., 167. 
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manufacture, sale, and transport of these weapons.57 Gray-covert transfers dominated the 
Cold War era arms trade, as exemplified by the U.S. or the former Soviet Union secretly 
arming surrogate states or revolutionary forces.58 This type of transfer continues to be a 
significant force and delivers the weapons “most likely to be used in conflict.”59 Gray 
transfers are transnational trades and generally require brokering – a means of providing 
clandestine “cover” for governments or groups involved in the trade.60  
Black market transfers are explicitly illegal: in clear violation of national and/or 
international laws and without official government consent or control. Examples of this 
type of trade include transfer to UN embargoed states or to transfer to groups banned by 
national laws, such as terrorists organizations. These transfers may involve corrupt 
government officials acting on their own for personal gain. Black transfer can be 
transnational or intra-state (e.g., sales between sub-national groups), although the scale or 
volume of weapons transfers depends on the mode of sale. As will be explored later, 
brokered (black) transfers connect the end-user to a larger potential supply of weapons 
than simple “retail” black market purchases. 
This simple typology of arms transfers (legal, gray, black) is essential to 
understanding the illicit arms trade. First, all three transfer mechanisms deliver weapons 
to state and non-state actors. Secondly, this typology identifies the actors involved 
(producer-suppliers, intermediaries such as brokers, and end-users). There are broad 
distinctions between types of suppliers, the required involvement of brokers and 
intermediaries, and the distinctions between types of end-user demand. A brief example 
suffices to highlight the differences. Legal government-to-government transfers consist of 
moving state-controlled supplies with minimal intermediate brokering to state recipients, 
                                                 
57  Laurance, Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventative Action, 
24-25. 
58 Green provides several historical anecdotes of Cold-War era gray market transfers. Owen Greene, 
“Examining International Responses to Illicit Arms Trafficking,” Crime, Law, and Social Change 33 
(2000), 151-190. 
59 Aaron Karp, “The Rise of Black and Gray Markets,” Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Sciences 135, (1994): 175-189.  
60  Lucy Mathiak and Lora Lumpe, “Government Gun-Running to Guerillas” In Running Guns: The 
Global Black Market in Small Arms (New York: Zed, 2000), 55. 
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whereas brokering is an operative necessity of gray and black transfers. All inter-state 
transfers require international transport (via sea, air, or ground), whereas intra-state black 
transfers often have lesser transport requirements. State stocks differ from private 
manufacturer stocks and from weapons “in circulation,” both in degree of control 
(security and accountability) and scale (available volume of weaponry). 
The legal-gray-black typology, while widely used in small arms research, neglects 
an important category of the arms trade that is relevant to internal conflict. This last 
category of arms transfer is transfer in completely unregulated markets. These transfers 
differ from the black market in that they are legal (absence of law vs. against the law) and 
they differ from legal transfers because there is an absence of governance to provide 
intent for control and use of weapons. This type of transfer occurs as intra-systemic flow 
– weapons in circulation in an ungoverned or under-governed political space, such as 
internal flows inside a collapsed or failing state. While transfers in unregulated markets 
can be considered a subset of black transfers, the distinction will be more relevant when 
disruption strategies are considered later. 
The key elements of the arms trade are the actors, the transfer mechanisms, and 
the arms themselves. The actors include suppliers, brokers, enablers such as transport 
agents, and the end users – all of which can be governmental or non-state actors. The 
transfer mechanism includes acquisition of a supply (locating and gaining access to stock 
or new production), required brokering activities (coordinating suppliers, financiers, 
transporters, and buyers), and the physical transport (air, land, sea, inter-state, and intra-
state). The quantity and value of the arms is the scale of the illicit trade. In addition to the 
more general problem of detecting and measuring illegal activities, measuring the scale 
of the arms trade is further complicated when traffickers create a “flow” of arms by using 
multiple transfers and a mix of weapons and ammunition. Arms traffickers may rely on 
multiple small transfers to move arms, rather than singe large transfer “events.” 
Moreover, traffickers often move a mix of materials over time - a broad selection of 
different weapons and associated parts, ammunition, and equipment. These goods are not 
easily identifiable through distribution and use due to the broad “basket” of goods and 
lack of uniform marking standards on the weapons, parts, and ammunition.  
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The primary problem or concern of illicit arms transfers is the capacity to create 
new power asymmetries in a political space. A large influx of new weaponry creates 
significant problems for the fragile security environment of the typical developing 
country. Transnational or inter-state black and gray transfers provide the primary means 
for delivery of large quantities of weapons. In contrast, internal black markets function to 
circulate or redistribute arms within the state and primarily to individuals.61 While in-
country or intra-system circulation may be significant in volume, this flow of weapons 
transfers, such as the clichéd black market or arms bazaar, is less relevant to the creation 
of new instabilities. Thus, the primary concern is the operative functioning of 
transnational or inter-state illicit arms transfers (black, gray, or unregulated). Moreover, 
we will establish that transnational arms transfers have a different structure than intra-
systemic or intra-state flows. 
C. THE SUPPLY OF SMALL ARMS: GOING GLOBAL 
The vast majority of small arms moved through gray and black transfers enter the 
supply chain as legal weapons.62 Weapons “become” illicit after production. As such, the 
global legal production of weapons is highly relevant to the illicit trade. The vast majority 
of weapons are manufactured legally with state authorization. At virtually any point in 
the supply chain, a legally produced weapon can become “gray” or “black” through theft, 
fraudulent sale, or transfer through or to inappropriate actors (unlicensed brokers or 
unapproved end users).  
The supply of small arms and light weapons has been globalizing since the early 
1990s and the end of the Cold War. Laurance identifies two key effects of the Cold War 
that are enabling the scale of the arms trade today: establishment of manufacturing 
capability to fuel Cold War-related arms races and production of a substantial surplus 
                                                 
61  Laurance, Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventative Action, 
25-26. 
62  Pete Abel, “Manufacturing Trends: Globalising the Source” In Running Guns: The Global Black 
Market in Small Arms, ed. Lora Lumpe (New York: Zed, 2000), 81. 
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stock of weapons.63 The fall of the Soviet Union resulted in a flood of surplus weapons 
from former Soviet States eager to sell them. The end of the Cold War resulted in a 
“loosening” of state control over the arms trade. Cold War tensions resulted in significant 
super-power control over the arms trade because of concern for the implications of the 
arms trade on interstate war. The post-Cold War shift to smaller wars coincided with a 
proliferation of the tools of small conflicts: small arms. 
The arms industry has been globalizing more generally for the past forty years. In 
the 1960s, 69 firms in 30 states produced small arms. By the 1990s, over 300 companies 
produced arms in 64 states.64 While some portion of this growth is attributable to 
privatization in the wake of the dissolution of Soviet Union (56 manufacturers in nine 
countries), the growth in manufactures and manufacturing states was relatively uniform 
from the 1960s. A significant force in the spread of production is the export of production 
licenses. Licenses allow manufacturers to produce weapons in other countries, are often 
concluded in secret (a matter of protection of producers’ proprietary information), and 
enable export. Over three-quarters of licensed producers in developing nations export 
small arms.65 The spread of production capability indicates increasing global access to 
small arms – as evidenced by an approximate 550 million small arms in circulation.66 
Increased access is apparent in the Middle East, as arms-producing firms have increased 
six-fold during the past forty years. 
The international small arms trade benefits from globalization (increased 
economic interdependence) just like all other international commerce. Burrows argues 
that globalization has been a “gift” to the arms trade.67 Globalization, through 
proliferation of information technology and the reduction in barriers to free trade, enables 
actors in the arms trade to more easily sell and deliver weapons around the world. 
                                                 
63  Laurance, Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventative Action. 
64  Abel, Manufacturing Trends: Globalising the Source, 82-83. 
65  Ibid., 88. 
66  Gideon Burrows, The no-Nonsense Guide to the Small Arms Trade (Oxford: New Internationalist 
Publications, 2002), 27. 
67  Ibid., 72. 
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International air travel, modern telecommunications, and international financial networks 
connect producers, brokers, and buyers globally. Improvements in international shipping 
capacity (air, land, and sea) facilitate the movement of cargo globally. As such, 
globalization is instrumental to the arms trade. 
Muggah provides a succinct analysis of the relationship between globalization and 
the illicit small arms trade: states are losing their monopoly over the tools of violence.68 
Globalization has reduced restrictions to movement of goods, while states have 
simultaneously reduced their oversight of commerce. Globalization has both increased 
access to and reduced control of small arms. This phenomenon is particularly germane to 
developing states because their relative wealth is declining with globalization and their 
security is declining with the increasing prevalence of internal wars. 
D. SMALL ARMS DEMAND 
The demand for weapons is a complex human phenomenon with cultural, 
psychological, and contextual dimensions. Human demand for weapons extends through 
history. Several authors argue that the acquisition of arms is an inherently human 
characteristic - a fact that is born out in the long history of violent human conflict.69 This 
section provides a systematic analysis of the demand for small arms and light weapons. 
The essential characteristic of weapons is their capacity to produce violence. As 
such, demand results from a need to conduct expressive or instrumental violence or to 
possess a capability of violence. Expressive violence has a goal of directly changing the 
power of an adversary (killing to reduce his capability) and has direct informational, 
psychological, and physical results. Instrumental violence serves to enable other 
objectives – i.e., political goals. Instrumental violence supports a purpose, whereas 
expressive violence uses violence as the purpose.70 From the perspective of small arms in 
                                                 
68  Robert Muggah, “Globalization and Insecurity: The Direct and Indirect Effects of Small Arms 
Availability,” IDS Bulletin 32, no. 2 (2001), 71. 
69  Robert O’Connell, Soul of the Sword (New York: Free Press, 2002). 
70  Kimberly Tobin, Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective (New Jersey: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 
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internal conflicts, the primary mode of violence for armed groups is instrumental 
violence in support of political or military goals. 
1. Supply Chain Demand 
In the flow of weapons from manufacturers, through brokers and transporters, to 
users, each step in the pathway generates demand. “Supply and demand for weapons 
should be viewed as interrelated variables, along the full continuum that stretches from 
their original production to their end use.”71 User demand is the initial step that generates 
intermediate demand from the brokers, transporters, and other intermediaries.72 This 
supply-chain model of demand results in several key considerations. First, users (whether 
individuals or groups) are globally distributed and demand varies greatly. Demand is 
distributed among the many users and intermediaries and along the many pathways 
between sources of supply and end users. Second, multiple intermediaries deliver a 
variety of products to globally distributed users. Lastly, there are multiple sources of 
supply.  
Brauer and Muggah provide an economic model of small arms that identifies 
demand as a function of motivation and means.73 Motivation provides the reasons for 
demand, whereas means enable weapons acquisition – overcoming cost to acquire and 
possess weapons. Motivation varies substantially between “consumers” (self-defense, 
recreation, or the symbolism of gun possession) and “producers” who acquire weapons as 
essential instruments for security, crime, coercion, etc…. Producers work in the “industry 
of armed violence.”74 Demand also differs between acquirers and possessors. Acquirers 
own weapons individually, whereas possessors take possession of arms temporarily for 
specific activities (e.g., soldiers using the militia’s arms). 
                                                 
71  David Atwood, Anne-Katherin Glatz, and Robert Muggah, Demanding Attention: Addressing the 
Dynamics of Small Arms Demand (Geneva: Small Arms Survey [2006]). 
72  Jurgen Brauer and Robert Muggah, “Completing the Circle: Building a Theory of Small Arms 
Demand,” Contemporary Security Policy 27, no. 1 (2006), 143. 
73  Ibid., 141. 
74  Ibid., 142. 
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Demand for Small 












Example: Criminals  
Non-Instrumental 
Individual  
Example: Recreational Owner, Self-
Defense Owner  
Table 2.   Small Arms Demand 
 
Brauer’s typology yields the distinction between consumer-acquirers and 
producer-possessors – groups that differ by relative motivations and means. Instrumental 
need motivates producer-possessor demand and producer-possessors may have 
substantially larger means of acquisition. Consumer-acquirer demand lacks instrumental 
need and may have lesser means of acquisition. This demand is inherently individual – 
even to the extent that broad social or cultural conditions result in common motivations 
amongst many individuals (e.g., common security concern yields individual need for 
weapons of self-defense). Producer-possessors are clearly the actors most relevant to 
armed conflict. Producer-possessor demand is inherently group demand. Groups or 
organizations provide collective motivation and means for group demand. Group 
operative objectives determine the demand for small arms. For example, the size and 
missions of militia forces dictate demand. 
This typology enables analysis of methods to reduce demand through 
manipulation of motivation (changing mode of production) and manipulation of means 
(raising costs through reduced access or availability to supply). Atwood offers that 
effective regulation and enforcement effects both motivation and means by raising the 
effective cost of arms.75 Moreover, Atwood illuminates the relationship between state 
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legitimacy and weapons demand: states that effectively provide security reduce the 
motivation to arm and states that effectively regulate arms control price.  
E. BROKERING 
This chapter previously stated that the arms trade is a system consisting of supply, 
demand, and brokering, and that the key elements of the arms trade typology are the 
actors, the transfer mechanisms, and the arms (scale). Informed by this model and the 
legal-gray-black typology, this section explores the role of brokering. Brokering is both a 
set of functions and a group of actors in the arms trade. Arms brokers, as will be 
developed in this section, serve as essential coordinators of arms trades by managing the 
transfer mechanism and coordinating/connecting all of the actors in the network. Entire 
books and numerous articles are devoted to detailed explanation of brokers’ methods, 
underscoring the complexity of brokering.76 Wood and Peleman offer the following 
“typical” anecdote of a broker’s work: “A Belgian resident, acting from a hotel room in 
Paris, brokers a deal between an arms sales agent in Lithuania, who is selling Russian 
weapons stocks, to a recipient in a war zone in Central Africa.”77 This section distills the 
critical aspects of brokering in order to complete the model of illicit arms trades.  
1. Defining Brokering 
Like definitions for small arms themselves, brokering has both practical and legal 
definitions. The Small Arms Survey (SAS) defines brokering by the “essence” of the 
activity: “the facilitation and organization of transactions on a relatively autonomous 
basis, and for some form of compensation or material reward (e.g. financial commission 
                                                 
76 See Lora Lumpe, ed., Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms (London: Zed, 
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 on the deal).”78 From a practical or operational perspective, brokers organize arms 
transfers between two or more parties. Legal definitions of brokering vary dramatically. 
Regulatory regimes will be addressed later, but definitions vary from narrow categories 
of activities (e.g., differentiating each intermediary actor’s role such as broker or shipper) 
to all-encompassing definitions that include the entire range of activities that constitute 
the transfer mechanism.79 The variety of difference in how brokering is legally defined 
contributes to the “loophole” problem that allows brokers to function internationally. For 
the purpose of analysis, I define brokering broadly to encompass the coordination of all 
activities, by all of the actors, in a variety of locations. Brokering is distinguishable from 
retail sales of weapons: sellers take possession of arms and deliver them directly to end-
users, whereas brokers are intermediaries that need not come into direct physical contact 
with either the weapons or the other relevant actors. This definition is consistent with the 
established model of the arms trade (supply, demand, and brokering with transfer 
mechanism, actors, and scale) and is supported by the tasks performed by brokers. 
U.S. law provides a broad definition of arms brokering:  
 
..any person who acts as an agent for others in negotiating or arranging 
contracts, purchases, sales or transfers of defense articles or defense 
services in return for a fee, commission or other consideration…[and] 
brokering activities include the financing, transportation, freight 
forwarding, or taking of any other action that facilitates the manufacture, 
export, or import of a defense article or defense service, irrespective of its 
origin…. This includes, but is not limited to, activities by U.S. persons who 
are located outside the United States or foreign persons subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction involving defense articles or defense services of U.S. or 
foreign origin which are located inside or outside the United States80.  
2. Brokering Functions and Characteristics 
The SAS identifies seven functions provided by brokers to buyers and sellers: 
prospecting, consultation, sourcing, negotiation, financing, gaining authorization, and 
                                                 
78 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001, 98. 
79  Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2004, 143. 
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organizing transport.81 Prospecting is the process of connecting buyers and sellers. 
Consultation is providing advice or technical information to buyers. Sourcing is 
identifying suppliers/dealers and procuring weapons. Negotiation is the brokers’ 
arranging of contracts with the buyer and seller. Financing is the transfer of money 
between the buyer, seller, and payment of other actors to facilitate the transfer (dealer, 
shipper, financial agents, paying for documentation, etc…, possibly including bribes). 
Gaining authorization is to obtain transfer licenses, end-user certificates, and required 
transport/shipment documentation. Lastly, organizing transport is contracting shipment of 
the weapons from the source to the user, often through multiple locations by air, land, and 
sea. The most externally identifiable functions are physical transport, financial 
transactions, and the document trail. These functions have physical characteristics, while 
the other functions are primarily informational. As will be explored later, these physical 
functions are commonly used to map out the “anatomy” of arms trades.82  
Brokers possess certain characteristics. First, brokers are skilled entrepreneurs.83 
Brokers maintain large networks of clients and supporting facilitators and rely on their 
competence to defeat regulatory controls and to avoid law enforcement. Brokers require 
significant expertise – they are specialists who navigate the legal obstructions to moving 
arms internationally. Unlike governmental foreign military sales motivated by political 
ends, private arms brokers operate for profit. Brokers operate autonomously and free of 
cultural, political, or other ideological links to the buyers and sellers that they 
coordinate.84 In this sense, they are free from constraint when choosing their clients. 
Second, brokers operate globally and operate away from the physical locations of the 
weapons and other actors. Modern communications, financial networks, and a mature 
international shipping industry allow brokers to operate globally. Geographically 
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dispersed operations and the use of intermediaries (i.e., indirect transfers of weapons or 
money through multiple locations between the source and end user) increase the 
difficulty of identifying and regulating brokering. SAS describes this trait as a broker’s 
invisibility: by not taking possession of weapons or collocating with other actors, the 
brokers remain invisible.85 Third, brokers operate in both legitimate and illegitimate 
realms.86 This happens both generally and for specific transactions. For example, a 
broker may operate to service fully legitimate state-to-state transfers because of 
government outsourcing. Alternatively, a specific transaction may start as a legitimate 
transfer – and then become illicit once the weapons divert to/through intermediaries that 
lead to an illegal end user such as an embargoed state or terrorist group. 
3. The Broker’s Role 
This section details the essential role of brokers in illicit small arms trade:  
Without brokers, the illicit weapons market would be far less accessible to 
buyers who, for example, may find themselves caught in the chaos of far-
flung conflicts or blacklisted by the international community. Without 
brokers, private individuals and companies seeking access to diamond and 
oil ‘war economies’ would lose their most basic bargaining chip—the 
steady flow of weapons. Most importantly, without brokers, the illicit arms 
market would lose its form and structure: the networks that sustain and 
channel the interactions of all involved. Without brokers, illicit arms 
transfers would also be far more difficult and risky. Brokers’ ability to use 
networks of contacts and intermediaries to facilitate a given weapons deal 
goes far beyond the mere provision of consultation. It is what gives their 
intangible activities such significance.87  
Brokers are involved in every aspect of the illicit arms trade and are equally 
involved in international black and gray trades. They are far less essential to 
legal/traditions government-government sales (“foreign military sales”) and to intra- 
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systemic flows (i.e., all intrastate transfers, black, gray, legal, or un-regulated), because 
their functions simply are not necessary in those cases. The broker’s task is specific to 
transnational black and gray trades 
Most evidence on the role of brokers derives from synthesis of newspaper 
reporting with criminal proceedings and other open-source media. The Small Arms 
Survey (SAS) and a variety of researcher organizations specialize in uncovering the 
methods used by specific notorious brokers or in detailing the methods used to deliver 
weapons to particular conflict zones such as West Africa in the 1990s.88 Review of the 
applicable literature on illicit brokering yields several generalization useful for this 
analysis. First, while research indicates that there are large numbers of arms brokers, 
brokering nonetheless requires a unique skill set. Specifically, brokers must gain 
competency at avoiding the existing rules targeted against their business. Second, brokers 
are essential to the transnational movement of large quantities of weapons. Brokers are 
less essential to intra-state flows – brokers are not resellers, but market coordinators. 
Lastly, brokers are illicit entrepreneurs. Brokers operate because of the profit potential 
that regulation provides. By their willingness to avoid and violate law to deliver weapons, 
they have a competitive advantage. As will be examined in a subsequent chapter, these 
characteristics have greatly inhibited the effectiveness of regulatory regimes. 
F. THE BROKER’S NETWORK 
The majority of existing small arms-related research focuses on market structure, 
but brokers make the market. Their importance rests in their ability to coordinate buyers, 
sellers, physical transport agents, and to avoid detection. In the information age, brokers 
need not take physical possession of arms to facilitate the trade, but brokers are essential 
managers of the information flow required to make the deals. While the physical flow of 
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arms takes a path from suppliers, to transports, and then to the end user, the information 
flow that enables the illicit arms trade is more complex. This section identifies that 
brokers operate a social network to enables the illicit arms trade – a network that is 
essential to the illicit trafficking of small arms. 
The broker’s network is a social network consisting of the actors in the trade: 
suppliers, brokers, end-users, financiers, and transport agents.89 The arms trade actors are 
the network nodes and their relationships are the links that connect the network. The 
network relies on highly connected actors or hubs that are essential to network function 
because most information flows through hubs.90 
 
Figure 1.   The Broker’s Network 
 
The concept of a broker’s network is supported by anecdotal evidence of illicit 
arms brokering and recent empirical research that uses the tools of social network 
analysis. While there is limited empirical evidence available, this research indicates that 
brokers actively manage networks to facilitate the arms trade. First, Curwen analyzes the 
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90  Ibid., 141. 
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roles of specific arms trade actors in selected illicit arms transfers to Africa.91 Curwen 
examines four well-document arms transfers using anecdotal data provided by the UN. 
These cases occurred between 1999 and 2002 and involved embargo-busting delivery of 
weapons into Africa. Curwen maps the structure of the arms trade as a social network by 
identifying the relationships between different actors in the trade (suppliers, brokers, 
financiers, and transport agents). Curwen concludes that brokers and shippers were the 
most central or essential actors in the delivery of small arms.92 The brokers act as critical 
connectors or hubs between all agents of the trade. Curwen concludes that the brokers’ 
centrality reflects their relative power or essential role in the trade. The brokers and 
transport agents formed a core group and that the relationship between brokers and 
transport agents was the critical social link in the trade.93  
In a similar manner, Kinsella uses social network analysis techniques to assess all 
transfers to Africa by state (location) for the period 1990 to 2002.94 Kinsella maps the 
arms trade in Africa by location and this method identifies the centrality of specific 
locations (sources and intermediaries) to the overall flow of arms in Africa. Kinsella 
identifies brokering “locales” involved in the trade and assesses the relative importance 
of supplier locales, recipient locales, and intermediary/trans-shipment locales. Kinsella 
identifies which African states were most central to the trade and, critically, that a limited 
number of state locales served as key “outflow hubs” – states that served as 
intermediaries for the Africa trade.95 
The conceptual basis for Kinsella’s analysis is of great significance to a broader 
understanding of brokering. Kinsella begins by defining market transactions as discrete 
financial transactions to maximize short-term profit and by defining network transactions 
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as a sequence of events part of an “overall pattern of enduring interaction.”96 Kinsella 
argues that networks require maintenance based on shared interests and ongoing 
relationships and hypothesizes that covert-illegal arms trading requires a common 
commitment by arms trade actors to protect their methods. The centrality of specific 
brokering locales over a long period and for a large data set indicates that that the illicit 
trade does function as a network with established relationships or pathways. Not only are 
arms brokers essential actors, but they actively maintain the pathways that route arms 
around the world. 
Milward and Raab’s model of dark networks supports this concept of a sustained, 
clandestine network. The configuration of the brokering network “results from resources, 
actors, and the linkages between them … that allow dark networks to balance and 
rebalance capacity for action with the need to survive and persist.”97 Empirical studies of 
the illicit arms trade identify the key actors in the broker network: brokers, financiers, 
transport agents, suppliers, and end users. Common interest in successful arms trafficking 
binds the actors together - end-users need weapons and the others seek profit. Moreover, 
they are linked by trust: “linkages between the nodes in a network are facilitated by trust 
between the actors based on reciprocity and the ability to reward cooperation by 
transferring resources to the complying party or in a dark network by fear of the 
consequences of non-compliance.”98 The illicit nature of the trade drives covert methods 
and functional differentiation among the actors: to spread risk for all, distinct functions 
are distributed amongst the actors.99 Brokers are not pilots, pilots are not financiers, 
financiers are not brokers, etc…. The actors are integrated through modern information 
technology – thus facilitating a global market. 
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G.  SUMMARY 
The arms market consists of legal, gray, black, and unregulated trade. Trans-
national illicit trades are the primary concern because they occur beyond state control and 
because they clandestinely introduce new military capability (power) to users that would 
otherwise be isolated from the global supply of arms. While intra-state black transfers are 
problematic, they are generally not on the scale of transnational flows. This typology 
allows refinement of the “small arms problem” to the disruption of transnational illicit 
flows to specified states or regions. 
The global supply of small arms is sufficient to deliver vast quantities of weapons 
and sufficient global trade infrastructure enables transfer anywhere in the world. Group 
demand is primarily of the producer-possessor type: arms demand stems from the 
instrumental use of the weapons in violent conflict. Demand, a function of motivation 
and means, derives (primarily) from achievement of a group’s purpose. This kind of 
demand is strongly tied to the root causes of violent conflict – thus presenting a tough 
problem for arms trade policy.  
In the last section, I examined how the physical flow of arms in the transnational 
illicit market is dependent on the functioning of the social network. The broker is the 
central figure and coordinator of the illicit network that enables delivery of arms from 
producer-suppliers to end users. 
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III. SMALL ARMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the supply and demand conditions for small arms in the 
Middle East.100 Demand for arms in the Middle East (ME) is a function of persistent 
conflict, weak states, and the prevalence of armed non-state groups. Additionally, there is 
a deeply embedded cultural component to the demand for arms in the Arab states of the 
ME. Overall, I argue that these conditions created chronic regional instability and support 
high demand for arms. The supply conditions are more complicated. There are few 
producers of arms in the ME. Both states and non-state groups rely on the global market 
to satisfy their strong demand for arms. I conclude by arguing that while demand for arms 
may be an “intractable” problem, the supply conditions provide the U.S. with an 
opportunity to influence the region by addressing the flow of arms to the region. 
B. DEMAND CONDITIONS 
1. Chronic Instability 
The ME is the largest arms market in the developing world. Legal sales to the 
region account for nearly half of all sales to developing states, with the U.S. providing 
nearly two-thirds of the arms for the region.101 The sheer scale of arms sales to the region 
(upwards of US $ 40 billion annually for legal sales) is a symptom of the region’s 
problems. Instability in the region is a product of conflict at the international, regional, 
and (intra) state levels.102 The states of the region are relatively new, with most have 
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been formed in the aftermath of the World Wars. At the international level, the region’s 
chronic instability includes a long pattern of external involvement in the region’s 
conflicts. This external involvement occurs for a variety of reasons, including conflict 
over access to the region’s oil. At the regional level, several persistent conflicts transcend 
state borders and have frequently produced violence (the Arab-Israeli conflict, Kurdish 
separatism, and conflict between Sunni and Shia states). At the state level and below, 
chronic state instability (and the weaknesses of Middle Eastern state governments) 
produced forty-five internal wars between 1945 and 2000. Internal wars relate to the 
prevalence of weak states and armed non-state groups throughout the region, such as 
tribal, ethnic, and religious groups. Globally, this relatively small region produces nearly 
twenty percent of all internal wars.103  
The region’s chronic instability results from the intersection or interaction of 
these three forms of conflict (international, regional, and state). States and non-state 
groups increasingly demand arms to gain and maintain power. States seek arms (power) 
to protect themselves from external state and internal non-state threats, whereas non-state 
actors seek arms to maintain their power vis-à-vis the state. Some of the many root causes 
of instability are religious conflict, ethnic conflict, and resource scarcity. These are 
complex, persistent problems and are likely to continue to drive the demand for arms by 
both state and non-state actors.  
Moreover, the rise of OPEC and the general enrichment of the region’s economy 
over the past thirty years through foreign trade gave both states and non-state actors 
increasing financial means with which to acquire arms. Klare argues that the arming of 
ME states relates directly to the strength of oil exports from the region.104 The increased 
wealth of ME states increases demand for legitimate or legal arms sales, whereas the 
prevalence of non-state actors in the region (terrorists, ethnic insurgent groups, and  
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religious groups) creates demand for illicit flows of arms. Illegitimate non-state groups 
such as terrorists cannot rely on legal arms sales; instead, they turn to the black and gray 
markets to meet their needs.  
2. Gun Culture in the Middle East 
In the Middle East, the socio-cultural context heavily influences small arms 
demand.105 Cultural and region specific conditions shape individual and group demand 
for small arms through values, norms, and practices. In 2006, The Middle East and North 
Africa Action Network on Small Arms (MENAANSA) studied public perceptions of 
arms in the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and Sudan – states with ongoing violent 
conflicts.106 Arabs perception sharply distinguished possession of arms for sport from use 
in conflict or security. MENAANSA attributed widespread gun ownership to the inability 
of states or governments to provide security, i.e., chronic instability.  
In 2002, the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy hosted a workshop for leading small 
arms researchers in the region. The workshop published the following conclusions: 
  
1. Weapons possession (public display) expresses cultural identity and honor. 
2. Small arms are symbols of power, confidence, authority, and manhood.  
3. Weapon firing serves as cultural expressions of celebration or happiness. 
4. Bedouin or tribal culture is a continuing source of small arms demand (a 
value).107 
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The workshop, which led to the creation of MENAANSA, focused on identifying 
measures to reduce small arms demand in the Arab region. The workshop resulted in a 
consensus view of Arab small arms demand from the assembled scholars. The experts 
concluded that culture and tradition drive individual and group demand in the region. 
3.  Small Arms Demand in Yemen 
There is very little detailed research on the demand for small arms and the impact 
of small arms in the ME, but there is a sufficient body of research on the impact of arms 
in Yemen. Yemen provides a particularly appealing country study for small arms. First, 
Yemen is a predominantly underdeveloped, rural, tribal, and Sunni Islamic state.108 
These conditions are representative of many ME states. Next, Yemen is a highly armed 
state with a long history of small arms possession across the society. The Small Arms 
Survey (SAS) estimates Yemen possesses between six and nine million small arms for a 
total population of fewer than nineteen million.109 Small arms have a significant role in 
Yemeni life, enabling a full assessment of small arms demand conditions. Lastly, the 
central government is weak, lacking control over large portions of the Yemeni 
territory.110 Conditions in governed areas as well as un-governed areas of Yemen have 
application to other parts of the Arab region. Yemen’s history of insurgency, Islamic 
terrorism, and civil war are indicative of internal stability problems. Furthermore, these 
are conditions found throughout the ME.  
Small arms demand in Yemen is primarily a function of tradition and custom. 
Furthermore, the Small Arms Survey (SAS) assesses that security concerns have not 
motivated gun possession.111 This assertion is limited to post-Civil War Yemen and 
ignores the fact that internal security problems drove demand for small arms during 
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Yemen’s long period of decolonization and civil war. Current demand may reflect 
tradition and custom, but the guns are present in Yemen because of war-related demand. 
Yemen’s long history of internal conflict, insurgency, and civil war resulted in 
widespread arming of Yemenis during the virtually continuous period of internal war 
from the 1960s to the 1990s. Both the SAS report and expert statements from the 2001 
Arab Small Arms workshop attest to the role of internal conflicts as the source for large-
scale proliferation of small arms in Yemen.112 Militant groups, separatist forces, tribes, 
and individuals sought arms during this period. SAS historical account of large-scale 
transfers of weapons into Yemen demonstrates a rough correlation between new sources 
of weaponry and Yemeni internal wars.113  
SAS’s analysis demonstrates that non-governmental demand derives from tribal 
(group) sources as well as from individuals. Tribes generate group demand for weapons, 
as evidenced by tribes’ common possession of large stocks of weapons and 
ammunition.114 Tribes utilize arms as instruments for land management and defense. 
Tribal traditions and customs provide values that motivate individual demand as well. 
SAS points to relatively low crime statistics (relative to population density and gun 
ownership statistics) and identifies that strong (possibly increasing) demand for weapons 
stems from the guns status as a social symbol. Yemeni males gain possession of arms as a 
symbol of manhood and “tribesman” status, rather than as instruments for action. This 
symbolic demand is relatively uniform across Yemen with the exception of certain areas. 
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Specifically, the Yemeni government has been able to impose strict controls to reduce 
public display of weapons in the capital Sana’a. Additionally, well-educated Yemenis 
and non-tribally affiliated individuals do not possess or publically display guns.115  
Even individual demand ultimately derives from Yemen’s tribal society to the 
extent that tribalism informs Yemeni values and culture, i.e., the tribe provides 
individuals the motivation for symbolic possession of arms. Eight values are the core of 
Yemeni tribalism and each relates to demand/possession of arms: piety, honor, generosity 
(or hospitality), courage, self-control, autonomy, land, and ideologies of descent.116 The 
highest value (honor or sharaf) is associated with the individual, family, and tribe, and 
weapons symbolize honor – both guns and daggers. The value hospitality requires 
protection of guests – implying a necessary practical capacity to defend with a weapon. 
Courage and self-control are also symbolized by public display of weapons, with the 
latter symbolized by not employing a weapon unless necessary. Yemenis perceive that 
autonomy, land, and ideology of descent (valuing family lineage) require protection 
through possession of arms. Clearly, tribal tradition and custom provide motivation and 
social meaning for small arms demand. “Weapons here are part of the national character 
and are linked to heritage, tradition, and norms, rather than to violence and killing.”117   
Just as tribes generate weapons demand, they also generate effective social 
controls for the use of weapons in Yemen. The tribal structure is the source of legitimacy 
in Yemen for several reasons, including the observation that armed tribes present a strong 
barrier to government control of tribal areas.118 Yemen’s long period of internal war and 
insurgency, with its attendant proliferation of weapons, presaged a resurgence of tribal 
identity in Yemen in the 1990s. The rise in tribal identification may partially explain 
Yemen’s comparatively low crime rate. There are effectively three forms of social 
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control in Yemen: norms, custom, and law.119 Tribes provide norms and custom and, due 
to weak a central government, tribes remain the primary source of social control. The 
basis of tribal law is a set of seventy rules (al-Qawa’id as-Sab’een) agreed upon by all of 
Yemen’s tribes, which regulate social behavior – including appropriate possession and 
use of weapons. One interesting aspect of Yemen is tribal regulation of violent acts of 
revenge (e.g., honor retribution). There are effectively three options of remediation after 
an honor killing: the killer’s tribe can offer the killer to the victim’s tribe for judgment, 
the killer’s tribe can offer financial compensation to the victim’s family, or the tribes can 
offer a mediated settlement (an exchange of money or weapons in compensation for loss). 
Conditions in Yemen present several important implications relevant to small 
arms demand in the region. First, Yemen’s high density of arms reflects strong demand 
for weapons at the individual, group/tribal, and state levels. Second, demand conditions 
are region-specific. Yemeni weapons demand has both individual-cultural and group-
tribal components. In both cases, tribal honor and social status interrelate with the 
weapons’ practical utility. “All Yemenis consider daggers as a social heritage and part of 
the local costume…they are not considered weapons.”120 Third, weapons in Yemen 
currently yield a tenuous internal balance of power between armed non-state groups 
(tribes, terrorists, and organized crime) and the state. SAS estimates that the tribes 
actually posses a superior arsenal to that of the state and that ownership (state or non-
state) is increasing.  
Individual demand stems from the gun as a symbol of honor, social standing, and 
manhood. Gun possession in the region is clearly an intrinsically male attribute.121 
However, there are multiple visible symbols of honor or prestige (wealth, property, 
etc…). Group demand extends from the tribe-based structure of Arab society. Here the 
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primary or traditional provider of defense and security is the tribe-family.122 The state 
bears secondary responsibility. Tribal identity is a function of land and livestock and 
control of property requires possession of arms. Furthermore, arms are instruments of 
conflict resolution for inter-tribe and inter-clan dispute. In short, both individual and 
group demand for arms in the ME is deeply embedded in the culture and values of the 
region. Small arms demand by non-state groups is likely to be an enduring factor in the 
region. 
C. SUPPLY CONDITIONS  
Despite strong demand and the steady global proliferation of arms production 
capacity, the Middle East has relatively little arms production capability. Only one ME 
state (Israel) has companies represented in the top one hundred arms producing/exporting 
companies, contributing less than $5 billion to global legal arms sales (under two 
percent).123 In contrast, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
database reveals sixteen ME countries are in the top 100 arms importing countries.124 
Generally, arms constitute $10-20 billion or close to fifteen percent of the regions imports 
(annually), whereas weapons exports make a negligible contribution to the ME’s total 
exports.125 The region is frequently the top arms-importing region of the world. 
Furthermore, Israel’s arms exports constitute most of the regions exports – another sign 
of the weak capacity of the region.126 Only thirteen firms in six countries (Israel, Iran, 
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Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia) produce small arms in the Middle East and 
these firms are not capable of satisfying the demand.127 While these statistics reflect the 
import/export imbalance in the legal arms market, they clearly indicate that the ME relies 
on the global-external supply of arms to satisfy demand. 
The scale of legal imports to ME is significant for several reasons. First, the limited 
regional production capacity forces ME states and non-state actors to rely on the global 
market for arms. Regional production just cannot meet demand. For illicit actors, this means 
reliance upon transnational arms trafficking networks and brokers to gain access to extra-
regional supplies of arms. Second, legal weapons are often diverted to the black and gray 
markets in conflict zones. States’ weapons are often stolen or seized in conflicts, thus legal 
state imports become a source of supply for non-state groups and illicit actors. While it is 
impossible to identify how much of the legal flow is exploited, these imports are nonetheless 
an opportunity to acquire arms. Third, the region’s persistent state of conflict and states’ 
continuing need to acquire arms provide a reason for ME states’ aversion to regulating the 
arms market. ME states have generally failed to adopt UN provisions for regulating the arms 
market, largely because they want to maintain their freedom to import arms without 
restrictions. In short, the region’s instability drives the region’s inability to regulate arms 
inflows. 
D. SUMMARY 
The demand for small arms in the Middle East is derived from the region’s persistent 
state of conflict and cultural preference for arms. International, regional, and state instability 
drive the import of arms for both states and non-state actors. Individuals and groups in the 
region regard small arms as a symbol of power, a product of the tribal culture that dominates 
the region. The demand for arms is likely to endure with the region’s values and instability. 
The region’s arms imports vastly exceed arms exports, representing both the strength of small 
arms demand and the dependence on the international arms market. As a result of these 
conditions, non-state actors such as terrorists and insurgents rely on illicit arms trafficking 
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networks to satisfy their need for arms. The next chapter examines potential strategies to 
disrupt the currently un-controlled flow of arms to the region. 
 45
IV. AVAILABLE DISRUPTION OPTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The illicit small arms trade is a tough problem. The trade is global, clandestine, 
dynamic, and involves small numbers of decentralized actors. Significantly, very few 
cases offer insight, solutions, or strategies to disrupt the trade. Perhaps the most 
intriguing historical case is the remarkable and nearly complete disarming of Japanese 
society during the Tokugawa shogunate from 1607 until 1879.128 Japan’s “reversion” to 
the samurai sword, though far removed from today’s global arms industry, provides a 
starting point for identifying the potential strategies to counter the illicit arms trade. Japan 
is a rare case of a state that successfully controlled arms flows. The shogunate used 
several methods to control the arms market and the case serves to introduce the three 
strategies presented in this chapter. 
1. Tokugawa Japan 
From 1543 until 1879, Japan radically changed their military capabilities after the 
Chinese introduced the matchlock gun. They rapidly mastered their use and production of 
guns and then employed them for nearly a century.129 Then from the mid 1600s until 
1879, the Japanese society survived almost entirely gun-free. Japan successfully removed 
modern guns from the state and the population by effectively controlling the small arms 
supply and demand within the country. While this historical case has limited applicability 
to the contemporary illicit small arms trade, Japan’s experience provides an interesting 
guide to potential disruption strategies.130 
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Godine Publisher, Inc., 1979). 
129  Ibid., 3-5. 
130 Specifically, the Tokugawa case is unique because the Japanese controlled all arms – legal and 
otherwise. There is a limit to apply lessons from complete disarment to the disruption of only the illicit 
trade. Moreover, Japan’s geographic and security situation is unique and unlikely to applicable to modern 
states. 
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Perrin provides a detailed analysis on why and how Tokugawa Japan was able to 
remove guns from society.131 First, the supply-side strategy was to nationalize gun 
production. In 1603, fifty-seven years after introduction of the matchlock to Japan, the 
first Tokugawa shogun seized control of feudal Japan. Shortly thereafter, the Tokugawa 
began incremental steps to gain control over small arms and gunpowder production. The 
central government first required licensing for all production. Next, all production was 
consolidated at Nagahama by 1607. Moreover, the government incentivized the 
gunsmiths’ cooperation with the Tokugawa regime. The state continued to pay annual 
salaries to gunsmiths (and even promoted some gunsmiths to samurai class), even if they 
produced nothing. Lastly, gunsmiths were encouraged to resume sword making. This last 
change provided a substitute for both producers and consumers. 
The counter demand strategy involved the substitution of the samurai sword for 
guns. First, there was a cultural preference for the sword. The warrior class was a sizeable 
dominant class in Japan, constituting upwards of ten percent of the population.132 Despite 
the established military utility of the gun and its efficient killing capability, the samurai 
preferred the sword to the gun because of the sword’s symbolic value to their class. 
Reverting to traditional weapons was fully acceptable in the context of Japanese martial 
culture and the samurai accepted the sword as an honorable substitute for the matchlock 
gun.133 Second, the symbolic value of the sword surpassed the killing power and utility 
of the gun. The sword was “the visible form of one’s honor.”134 The sword possessed 
artistic, cultural, and social (status/prestige) value that offset the utility of guns. 
The final strategy, controlling commerce, again consisted of nationalizing the 
arms industry. The state retained approval authority over any request to produce, import, 
or export arms.135 In this sense, the state controlled commerce by directly controlling 
                                                 
131 Perrin, Giving Up the Gun: Japan’s Reversion to the Sword, 1543-1879, 33-42, 58-62. 
132 Ibid., 33. 
133 Ibid., 9. 
134 Ibid., 36. 
135 Ibid., 62, 64. 
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arms trade actors. Japan is in a position of geographical isolation and given the state of 
international shipping during the period, they were able to effectively monitor and control 
imports and exports. Geopolitical considerations also allowed the Japanese to abandon 
guns without creating vulnerability to invasion. Japan’s regional and global reputation as 
a military power deterred both European and regional threats from attacking the Japanese 
islands. Japan had a credible capability to defend the main territory. Japan avoided all 
external military conflicts for the entire Tokugawa period.136 Moreover, the removal of 
guns began as part of a general reaction against foreign ideas from Europe. The state 
declared a policy of isolation in 1636, primarily as a reaction to Christian missionaries.137  
2. An Outline of the Options 
This chapter presents the disruption strategies that follow from the Tokugawa 
case and the two models of arms trade presented previously. Each model of the arms 
trade yields different options for disrupting illicit arms transfers. First, the illicit small 
arms trade is a transnational market enabling exchange through the buying and selling of 
arms. Secondly, the trade is a network – brokers coordinate the functions of the actors to 
sustain their entrepreneurial endeavor. This chapter presents the disruption options that 
relate to these two models of the trade. The available disruption mechanisms are then 
evaluated for their logic and, when available, empirical efficacy.138 
In the market view of the arms trade, states control the trade by regulating either 
supply or demand. Conceptually, the goal of regulation is to reduce the available supply 
of arms or to reduce the demand for arms. The key issue is whether regulation succeeds 
at preventing arms trade with banned states or groups – a strategy of access denial or 
exclusion of certain actors from an otherwise free market.  
                                                 
136  “Japan” http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761566679_17/Japan.html#p291 (accessed January 
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137  Perrin, 41. 
138  Disruption is defined here as effort to prevent or reduce the illicit transnational transfer of arms to 
particular groups, states, or regions. 
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In the network view of the arms trade, the brokers’ network of intermediaries 
enables the illicit transfer of arms. Banned users are limited to black or gray trades to 
acquire their arms and rely on brokers’ networks to deliver the necessary arms. The 
network enables transnational flows of arms – the source of new power asymmetries to a 
state or region. In the absence of new influx of weaponry, the illicit user is isolated from 
sources of arms beyond the existing supply of arms in the state/region. 
This chapter identifies three strategies for disrupting the illicit small arms trade 
that follow from structure of the arms trade. I evaluate the first two options (attempts to 
affect the supply or demand conditions in the arms market) and conclude that these 
strategies are not viable. I will argue that these strategies are impractical and ineffective. 
The third approach, disrupting the network of illicit brokering, has the best potential in 
fighting the illicit arms trade. Although this last approach has not previously been used 
against the arms trade, it has been successful against analogous or related problems such 
as terrorism and organized crime. 
Disruption Strategies: 
1. Supply Regulation: deny illicit actors access to arms.  
2. Demand Manipulation: reduce demand for small arms. 
3. Countering the Brokering Network: prevent the brokering network from 
functioning to deliver arms. 
B. MARKET-BASED STRATEGIES  
1. The Supply Regulation Strategy 
Supply regulation is the current and prevailing policy choice for the international 
community and the U.S.139 This approach consists of establishing laws and legal 
enforcement mechanisms to prevent producers, brokers, and transportation agents from 
transferring arms to designated users. The objective of supply regulation is to reduce (or 
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ideally to eliminate) access to the arms market by “banned” end-users – specified states 
or groups. International and national laws and international agreements all reflect the 
supply-side regulation approach, even to the extent that they regulate brokering.140 This 
approach has two parts: establishing laws and enforcing laws. This section argues that 
both establishing and enforcing regulation is impractical and has been empirically 
ineffective. 
Supply-side regulation, while necessary to control the overall global arms market, 
is unlikely to affect the arms trade in the short-term. The purpose of supply regulation is 
to restrict the flow of arms to specific users. Supply regulation functions to reduce the 
availability of weapons in the illicit market, thereby raising the relative price of arms 
because of scarcity, and then prevent market transactions because of higher prices. Ideal 
regulation would limit weapons access for all illicit actors (brokers, re-sellers, buyers, 
etc…). Supply regulation does not seek to decrease the overall production or supply of 
weapons or to increase the cost of weapons through taxes.  
Several factors make the regulation strategy insufficient. The illicit trade (the 
actors and the methods) exists to circumvent legal controls and to deliver arms to banned 
end users. Brokers move arms internationally and navigate around regulatory obstacles to 
enable illicit transactions. Contemporary research indicates that illicit networks adapt to 
governmental control efforts and are resilient in the face of regulatory control.141 In a 
global market with many sources of supply and global means of supply distribution, 
isolating the illicit trade from the global supply of arms is not practical.  
Effective regulation requires uniform international laws and enforcement – global 
supply requires global control, otherwise brokers can continue to circumvent well-
regulated states by using unregulated states as intermediaries. This requirement is 
unlikely to be met due to the extreme difficulty of enacting national legislation globally. 
Empirically, nearly thirty percent of UN member states lack the regulatory framework 
                                                 
140 Small Arms Survey gives a good overview of anti-brokering regulations. Small Arms Survey, 
Small Arms Survey 2004 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 147. 
141  Lora Lumpe, ed., Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms (London: Zed, 2000), 
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recommended by the UN. 142 Only 37 of 191 member states have established laws to 
regulate brokering. This is the most significant regulatory gap or deficiency, since the sin 
qua non of brokering is the deliberate avoidance of laws through careful “routing” of 
weapons transfers to circumvent detection and regulation. Every state that lacks illicit 
trafficking regulation offers brokers a conduit or route to banned users. The point is that 
establishing uniform international regulation is an unachievable requirement for effective 
supply regulation (at least in the current global political environment). Moreover, 
regulation must function to reduce supply available to unstable states or conflict zones. 
These are the places where state control is least likely to be effective and where the illicit 
trade is likely to flourish. 
Research on the regional prices of weapons underscores the importance of 
uniform international laws. Empirically, regulation of the arms market successfully 
increased the price of small arms in regions where regulation has been enacted (notably 
Europe and the Americas). Killicoat tracks trade by region (Asia, the Middle East and 
Africa, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the Americas) and identifies a steady 
increase in the market price of AK-47 assault rifles in Western Europe from the early 
1990s until 2005.143 Western Europe has the strongest regional and national measures 
against illicit arms trafficking.144 In contrast, the most conflict-ridden regions (Eastern 
Europe and the Middle East) show little change in small arms prices during the period. 
Killicoat also shows how prices have actually dropped in states with ongoing (or recent) 
civil wars.145 This empirical observation yields several insights. The Middle East and 
North Africa showed steady prices, despite ongoing conflicts and lack of substantial 
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intra-regional weapons production. The implication is that regulation is a regional 
problem. Regulation of the largest arms producing regions (Western Europe and North 
America) works in those regions, but fails to impact market conditions in conflict-ridden 
regions such as the ME (weapons still flowed to these regions, hence the small arms 
problem). 
A strong form of supply regulation is an enforced international arms embargo. 
Despite the problem of detecting and measuring embargo violations, a recent report by 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) evaluating the effectiveness 
of UN arms embargoes shows that embargoes are frequently violated and frequently fail 
to meet embargo objectives (policy change by the targeted state or group).146 Embargo 
success depends on the strength of enforcement (introduction of UN peacekeepers into 
the embargoed states and resolute support by the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council improved embargo effectiveness) and on broad support for the embargo. States 
frequently ignore UN embargoes when state or regional interests prevail over state 
commitments to the UN.147 The point is that embargoes have been ineffective for a 
variety of reasons and it may not be practical to pursue the embargo as an arms disruption 
strategy - despite their potential for success. Embargoes may actually function to create 
an illegal market by providing a business opportunity for illicit brokering. 
International efforts to regulate the arms trade are relatively new, dating to the 
early 1990s. Thus far, the process of establishing uniform laws has been slow and 
uneven. However, because effective regulation requires uniform international law and 
enforcement, regulation is unlikely to be an effective strategy in the short term. While the 
Japanese may have been able to regulate the supply-side of the market in the seventeenth 
to nineteenth centuries, their success is was likely a result of the unique conditions of 
their arms market at the time – an island market, with limited import/export of arms, that 
could apparently be isolated fairly efficiently. These same conditions are unlikely to be 
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reproduced in today’s globalizing economy. International regulation is necessary to 
control the arms market generally, but regulation alone is not likely a sufficient condition 
for disrupting the illicit arms trade. The U.S. should continue the current policy (an 
attempt to strengthen international regulation), but should look to other options for the 
short term and for specific cases. 
2. The Demand Reduction Strategy 
The second market-based strategy for disrupting the arms market is to reduce 
demand for small arms. This strategy entails attacking either the motivation or the means 
that constitute group demand for arms. The small arms literature virtually ignores the 
concept of reducing demand for arms, perhaps because reducing demand for arms 
appears to be a costly and complicated fool’s errand. Human demand for weapons has 
existed throughout the existence of humanity. War, conflict, and arming appear to be a 
persistent human characteristic. Consequently, it is unlikely that any effort will reduce 
demand for weapons. However, this section is concerned with strategies to reduce 
specific groups’ demand for weapons.  
The demand for arms consists of means and motivation – the ability to overcome 
price and the reason or need for arms.148 Reducing the “means” component of arms 
demand requires either increasing arms prices or somehow removing groups’ financial 
support or sources of income to buy arms (so-called threat financing). The very nature of 
small arms confronts the possibility of making weapons too expensive for armed groups. 
Small arms are inexpensive and plentiful, with over 550 million small arms in circulation 
globally and more in production every day. In the absence of a unified global effort to 
raise weapon prices artificially, it is unlikely that any effort will succeed to raise arms 
prices. Moreover, there is no clear evidence that attacking the financial support (the 
means for arms) is likely to be effective. First, while small amounts of money can only 
purchase small quantities of arms and ammunition, even a tight-budgeted terrorist or 
insurgent can yield disproportionately large effects with a small quantity of arms and 
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ammunition. Second, countering threat financing is a relatively new and unproven 
concept – we do not yet have a thorough understanding of the real effectiveness of 
financial “attacks.”149 While countering threat financing may be a necessary and useful 
method for attacking small arms demand, inevitably the low prices and asymmetric 
effects of light weapons make the “motivation” for arms a more significant part of the 
small arms demand problem. 
Reducing the “motivation” component of arms demand is even more problematic. 
Many creative methods could potentially be used to reduce demand for arms. For 
example, gun users (groups) could be convinced that certain guns were dangerous to use 
by covertly introducing faulty ammunition or guns – effectively deterring use of specific 
weapons out of physical fear. Returning to the case of the Tokugawa regime the unique 
cultural preference for the sword prevailed over the utility of the gun. Culture, group, or 
weapon-specific methods could be used to dissuade groups from the possession and use 
of guns. The demand approach requires specific methods – and conditions may or may 
not exist for them to work. For example, there is an apparent cultural preference for 
public display of arms as a symbol of power among Arabs in the Middle East150. It may 
be extremely challenging to find and implement/substitute a “stronger” symbol of power 
in that context. 
Ultimately, reducing “motivation” means getting groups to substitute non-violent 
political action for violence, alleviating the underlying causes of conflict, or changing 
group norms (creating a normative aversion to the use of arms). These methods are all 
unlikely to be successful in the short term. First, non-state groups that need arms for 
political purposes likely do not have viable non-violent options – particularly in unstable 
or poorly governed states. Second, addressing the root causes of conflict is a complicated 
long-term process – not a practical strategy that would be useful for reducing arms  
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demand and the need for illicit weapons in the short term. Lastly, changing norms and 
values is (again) a complicated long-term process. Reducing the “motivation” for arms is 
not likely to be a feasible strategy. 
C. A NETWORK-BASED STRATEGY: TARGETING THE BROKERS AND 
MIDDLEMEN 
1. Network Disruption Strategies 
In the network view of the arms trade, the brokers’ network enables the illicit 
transfer of arms. Illicit users are limited to black or gray trades to supply their arms and 
rely on brokers’ networks to deliver the necessary arms. The purpose of this strategy is to 
disrupt the transfer of arms by disrupting the network of actors that facilitate the trade. 
While the concept of regulating supply and demand is old, network disruption is a 
relatively new field of study. Networks, not unlike hierarchies, markets, and states, 
require a structure-specific set of strategies to disrupt network function. This section 
identifies the ways to attack the brokering network. These methods have been 
successfully applied to other illicit networks such as terrorist organizations and organized 
crime and provide a potential guide for disrupting the illicit flow of small arms. 
A network is a set of actors linked by their relationships. The first problem is 
defining success in combating a network: the goal of network attack is to reduce the 
network’s ability to “fulfill” the group’s purpose. The key operative elements of the 
network include the actors, their relationships, and the organizing principle of the 
network (e.g., the collective purpose of the actors). With each element is an increasing 
degree of complexity. The actor is a simple binary variable – the actor exists or not. From 
an observation standpoint, the actor is observed (identified) or not. The relationships are 
complex and multivariate because they involve influence: does the relationship involve 
authority, what is the direction of influence between any two actors, is there a hierarchy, 
etc…. More complicated still is the complexity of the purpose or organizing principle of 
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the network.151 The network purpose greatly affects the “resilience” of the network to 
attack: when ideology provides the purpose for a set of networked actors, decentralized 
action can still support the overall goal. In contrast, networks characterized by greater 
centralization rely upon central direction to ensure actors’ activities support the overall 
goal. Thus, the strength of the network purpose relates to network resilience.  
Four strategies (to reduce the network function) follow from basic elements of a 
network: attack the nodes, attack the links or relationships, attack the purpose (i.e., 
prevent action by somehow undermining the logic or purpose of the network), and isolate 
the network (i.e., prevent mobilization of new actors or adaptation of the network):  
 
Strategy Counter-Node Counter-Link Counter-Purpose Isolation 
Target Attack the Nodes Attack the 
Relationships 
(Undermine 




Attack the networks 
purpose: remove or 
delegitimize the 
actor’s reason for 










to the Illicit 
Brokering 
Network 
Capture or Kill Key 
Trade Actors: Brokers 
and Transport Agents 
Breed distrust 
between illicit trade 
actors 
Remove the profit 
potential of illicit 
arms trading. 








Table 3.   Counter Network Strategies 
 
The first strategy, nodal attack, requires direct attack against key figures, such 
capturing or killing the central actors.152 This strategy is most effective on networks 
containing a degree of centralized authority, because removing core actors isolates 
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peripheral actors from necessary operative control or direction. Nodal attack has less 
utility against decentralized networks. Carley and Tsvetovat use simulations to show that 
attacking the key actors in a decentralized network results in maximum short term 
damage to the network, but that networks are built to adapt and will “heal” themselves” 
in the long run.153 If isolating key nodes (capturing, arresting, killing terrorist leaders) 
does not undermine the network’s underlying principle or ideology, the ideology will still 
promote the terrorist action that counter-nodal targeting seeks to prevent. “If enough hubs 
are destroyed, the network breaks down into isolated, non-communicating islands of 
nodes.”154 The counter-nodal strategy is likely to be very effective against illicit arms 
networks. First, there is significant functional differentiation between actors – each actor 
(broker, transporter, financier, etc…) has a unique function and skill set. Arresting, 
capturing, or killing a central actor such as a broker is likely to debilitate arms networks. 
The counter-nodal strategy has been effective against other illicit networks such as 
criminal organizations, drug cartels, and terrorist groups. Typically, the arguments 
against a counter-nodal strategy include direct attacks against key individuals further 
decentralize networks, direct attacks are counter-productive other efforts to de-legitimize 
a networks purpose, and that attacking individuals fails to disrupt the function of 
networks with “redundant” structures. These arguments fall short when the 
structure/nature of illicit arms trafficking is considered. Arms trade actors perform 
specialized tasks, act in small/non-redundant networks, and operate for profit. Removing 
key actors through direct attack can debilitate a trafficking network by removing a key 
capability and by destroying profit potential (e.g., attacking a broker removes his 
essential skill, prevents coordination of the “deal,” and disrupts future work by associated 
actors). 
Attacking the relationships means reducing the network’s ability to communicate 
or reducing the effective influence between actors. Dark networks organize by trust: 
ruining the trust that links terrorists undermines the ability of the network to function. 
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This strategy, like the counter-nodal strategy, requires identification of the nodes. This 
strategy truly reflects the term “undermining a network,” because the purpose here is to 
undermine the trust that allows dark networks to function. In the context of arms 
networks, this strategy means “disconnecting” the actors by breeding distrust (actions that 
discredit certain actors) or disrupting their communications. If transport agents can be 
convinced that a broker is unreliable (will fail to pay their commissions) or that dealing 
with a particular broker will result in an arrest, then the network will have been 
undermined. This strategy has potential for use against illicit brokering, but is likely more 
difficult than the counter-nodal strategy. While nodal-attack just requires identifying and 
locating key trade actors, breeding distrust requires actively collecting intelligence and 
“engaging” the actors – a significantly larger resource commitment than nodal attack. 
While this is a useful strategy, it may not be appropriate in a resource-constrained 
context. 
The third strategy, attacking the purpose, is a degree more complex. In short, this 
strategy aims to remove actors’ reason for action. The strategy, by logical necessity, will 
be specific to the network purpose and there are as many strategies as there are dark 
network purposes. Arms networks are based purely on entrepreneurial spirit and aim 
operate for profit; hence, brokers like Viktor Bout provide arms for all sides in a conflict. 
Removing the profit potential of the arms trade equates to increasing the brokers’ 
expected cost for a transaction, e.g., increasing the risk of compromise or arrest. This 
strategy, effectively, is the same as the counter-nodal strategy by targeting key actors for 
interdiction. 
The last strategy, isolation, involves reducing network function by removing key 
inputs and outputs of the network such as human resources, money, and communications. 
Networks, like any system, require certain essential inputs to produce their desired 
outcome. The isolation strategy entails limiting a networks access to essential inputs. 
Isolating arms network from key inputs means reducing availability of weapons, financial 
systems, and transport vehicles. Given that the arms trade is global and clandestine, this 
strategy may be difficult and is unlikely to be effective against small arms networks. 
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D. SUMMARY 
 Disruption of the Illicit Small Arms Trade 
Strategy Successful Disruption Unsuccessful Disruption 
Regulatory 
Controls 
 Imperfect system of laws and enforcement. 
Demand-
Manipulation 
 Persistent group demand for weapons. 
Network 
Disruption 
Countering the illicit brokering 
network. 
 
Table 4.   Comparison of Disruption Strategies 
 
The illicit trade in small arms is a market facilitated by a network of brokers and 
intermediaries. In this chapter, I presented and evaluated three potential strategies for 
disruption of the illicit trade in small arms (summarized in the table above). The first 
strategy (supply regulation) is impractical because the process of encouraging states to 
enact legislation is slow and not uniform. Moreover, enforcement remains problematic – 
as evidenced by the weakness of UN arms embargoes. While continued effort to regulate 
the arms market may be useful and effective in the long term, this strategy is 
inappropriate for targeting the trade in a specific region or for disrupting trade to a 
specific state or group. The second strategy (demand manipulation) is problematic due to 
the very nature of small arms – group demand for small arms is persistent and directly 
relates to more complex political and security problems. As long as groups require a 
coercive or violent option, small arms demand will persist. The third option (countering 
the brokering network) is an untested approach, but does offer an appropriate method for 
disrupting the function of the illicit trade for a specific region, state, or group. I conclude 
that market-based strategies (supply regulation or efforts to reduce demand for arms) are 
unlikely to be effective in the short term. In contrast, network-based strategies are likely 
to be effective against specific brokering networks and regions. The potential 
effectiveness of these strategies demands further development and is the subject of the 
next chapter.  
 59
V. THE ANTI-BROKERING STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When Charles Taylor invaded Liberia, he unleashed the most deadly 
combat system of the current epoch – the adolescent human male 
equipped with an AK-47 assault rifle.155 
 
Having established that the illicit small arms trade is a global challenge, the last 
chapter examined three potential strategies for dealing with the problem. I determined 
that attempts to control supply or demand (alone) are unlikely to be effective strategies, 
but that the unique way that the illicit arms trade functions provides an opportunity. In 
this chapter, I propose a strategy for countering the illicit brokering network as means to 
affect the illicit arms trade. In Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army 
War College Strategy Model, Yarger presents Art Lykke’s “three-legged stool” model for 
strategy.156 This simple method shows that sound strategy consists of well-balanced ends, 
ways, and means.  
This chapter employs Lykke’s model to developed strategy for countering the 
illicit small arms trade by identifying ends, ways, means, and constraints. I argue that the 
U.S. can successfully disrupt the illicit arms trade, in specific areas, by adopting limited 
objectives, using proven counter-network methods, and by employing U.S. Special 
Operations Forces (SOF). 
B. ENDS (OBJECTIVES) 
At the outset, any U.S. policy on the illicit trade in small arms must focus on real 
security interests. The U.S.’ primary interests are national security and maintenance of 
                                                 
155  Michael Klare, “The Kalashnikov Age,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, no. 1 (1999), 18. 
156  Richard H. Yarger, “Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College 
Strategy Model,” http://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/stratpap.htm (accessed May 1, 2007). 
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the U.S.’ relative military power, political system, and economic strengths.157 Disrupting 
the illicit trade in small arms serves U.S. national interests by preventing or reducing the 
effects  that arms have on the security of the U.S. or critical allies. Unfortunately, small 
arms are ubiquitous and the trade is global. Consequently, full control of the small arms 
trade is probably an unattainable objective. The nature of the small arms problem 
demands the adoption of limited objectives. Objectives must be consistent with U.S. 
interests, but also recognize the unique challenges or difficulties of countering a global 
problem like small arms. Several U.S. strategies have been relative failures because of 
overly broad (“global”) objectives, such as the War on Drugs or (arguably) the Global 
War on Terrorism.  
Given the understanding of the arms trade developed in Chapter II, it is 
unreasonable to think that the U.S. can unilaterally stop the illicit trade in small arms. 
With the number of arms producing states, the number of small arms in circulation, the 
relative size of the illicit arms trade, and the robust global transportation infrastructure, 
countering the entire illicit trade system is an overly ambitious objective. In contrast, the 
U.S. should focus on preventing and reducing the flow of arms to specific groups, states, 
or a region. This approach focuses the objective on the root problem: the illicit flow of 
arms has the potential to change the power of the U.S.’ adversaries. For example, the 
flow of arms to anti-U.S. insurgents, terrorists, and militias threatens U.S. interests by 
empowering our adversaries in combat zones such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 
Philippines. The limited objective of the U.S. should be to disrupt the illicit flow of small 
arms to specific groups, states, or regions. 
This objective is part of a preventative approach to  managing the national 
security interests abroad. The current strategic environment is complex. Intra-state wars 
have been on the rise since 1945 and are the dominant form of conflict, dwarfing inter-
state war in frequency and duration. Non-state actors, such as trans-national terrorists, 
present an asymmetric threat to U.S. security domestically and abroad. At the same time, 
the U.S. must be judicious in the application of power to deal with these problems. It is 
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extraordinarily expensive for the U.S. to intervene in or participate in intra-state conflicts 
abroad, so the U.S. must carefully choose when to commit resources to these problems. 
The economic cost of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan exemplifies the importance 
of this strategic choice. Contemporary intra-state and sub-state conflicts rely on critical 
inputs such as people (popular support), arms, and money. Countering the illicit trade in 
small arms would serve to reduce one critical “input” to a specific conflict, potentially 
shaping the conflict’s outcome without requiring direct U.S. involvement. 
This objective is completely consistent with current U.S. policy objectives on the 
arms trade.158 The U.S. has a stated policy and clear interest in reducing the illicit arms 
trade globally, whereas the disruption strategy proposed here focuses on specific groups, 
states, or regions. The primary difference between current policy and this proposed 
strategy is the set of methods used and the limited goals. A disruption strategy is an 
available tool for use against specific conflicts or threats, as opposed to an attempt to 
control a global problem. For example, an appropriate objective is to prevent the flow of 
arms to a specific terrorist group such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), as opposed to prevent 
arms sales to terrorists globally.  
This concept (arms trade disruption) is consistent with current military operational 
concepts and doctrine. Military doctrine is useful for demonstrating how the arms 
disruption strategy fits into the overall national security strategy. The Department of 
Defense’ Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, identifies fighting arms trafficking 
primarily as a non-conflict role for the military. This publication assigns regional 
responsibility for arms trafficking disruption to the Geographic Combatant Commands as 
part of a broader strategy to maintain U.S. interests and manage/prevent conflict. 
“[Combatant Commanders] and subordinate JFCs conduct a wide range of military 
engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities in support of [other 
government agencies] OGAs and intergovernmental agencies to prevent unstable 
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situations from escalating into larger conflicts.”159 The U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) further identifies illicit arms trafficking as a component of 
irregular warfare.160 USSOCOM, the proponent for irregular warfare and the irregular 
warfare joint operating concept, acknowledges a need to counter arms trafficking as part 
of a broader strategy for specific irregular conflicts. 
At the service level, the U.S. Army clearly identifies the illicit arms trade as a 
threat to U.S. interests and identifies the arms disruption strategy as an operational 
requirement. “Transnational groups conduct a range of activities that threaten US 
interests and citizens at home and abroad. Such activities include terrorism, illegal drug 
trading, illicit arms and strategic material trafficking, international organized crime, 
piracy, and deliberate environmental damage.”161 Army doctrine nests with joint doctrine 
and identifies that military forces have a responsibility to combat illegal arms trafficking. 
“Combatant commanders support multinational arms control agreements concerning 
prohibited weapons and illegal arms trafficking. They also provide forces and control 
means to block the sale or transfer of arms to terrorists or other criminals as the Secretary 
of Defense directs. Such actions may be unilateral or multinational.”162  
C. WAYS (METHODS) 
The objective (disrupt illicit arms trafficking) is well established in U.S. policy 
and military operational concepts, but the methods or “ways” are lacking. As stated 
previously, the U.S. currently relies on regulation. This method may be necessary to 
control the arms trade generally, but is unlikely to have timely effects against a specific 
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target. Despite this legalistic focus, the U.S. does take limited action against arms 
brokering – efforts that are a good start, but still inadequate.  
Two cases highlight these efforts. First, U.S. law enforcement agencies target 
illicit arms brokers for arrest when relevant to other criminal activities such as drug 
trafficking and terrorism. These efforts are opportunistic and do not represent a concerted 
or deliberate strategic effort to disrupt arms trafficking by targeting brokers; rather, they 
are efforts to target arms brokers to solve other problems. Nonetheless, these efforts show 
that the U.S. has the capability to target brokers and that the effort is feasible. We can 
return to the case of Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout and note that foreign police arrested 
Bout as a benefit of intelligence collected in a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency counter-
drug operation.163 Second, the U.S. operates against analogous arms networks at the 
tactical level in Iraq – primarily to counter the movement of improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) and associated materials. Here, U.S. military forces are operating at the 
tactical level against an existing problem. This effort is reactionary, as opposed to 
preventative efforts to reduce the flow of new arms and materials into an operational 
area.164 A deliberate effort to disrupt the illicit arms trade lies between our current 




                                                 
163  Seth Mydans and Raymond Bonner, “Major Arms Dealer Arrested in Thailand,” The New York 
Times, March 6, 2008, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com (accessed March 6, 2008). 
164  Some may argue that sufficient IED material existed inside Iraq prior to the U.S. invasion and that 
the Iraq IED problem does not require the transfer of equipment from beyond Iraq. The point is that some 
external material is a critical requirement to complete IEDs, such as initiating devices (detonation cord, 
blasting caps) and remote controls. These items are critical external inputs to the IED problem.  
 64
Figure 2.   A Process for Disrupting Arms Trafficking 
 
Meeting the limited objective of arms trade disruption requires a familiar process 
of intelligence collection and operations (See figure above). First, identify a group, state, 
or region, which is critical to U.S. interest and susceptible to violent conflict. There are 
many such cases that are critical to U.S. interests, but that do not warrant direct U.S. 
intervention or action for a variety of political, economic, or other constraints. Examples 
include isolating the insurgency in Iraq or al-Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan from arms 
and ammunition. The key is to identify a specific strategic or operational problem that 
can be mitigated or minimized by reducing the flow of arms. Second, identify the flow or 
potential flow of arms to the target. This step requires group or region-specific expertise, 
a set of arms-flow indicators, and an ability to monitor or collect intelligence on the 
indicators. Laurance proposes a set of arms flow indicators that precede arms flows 
(“early warning indicators”) that include monitoring the black market price of specific 
weapons, public displays of weapons, and involvement/support by known arms-providing 
states.165 Furthermore, a variety of ingenious methods have been developed to indirectly 
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detect illegal arms flows, such as analyzing the economic performance of firms in the 
arms industry.166 The U.S. can develop and monitor a set of indicators for specific group 
or state.  
Third, gather intelligence and conduct intelligence operations to identify the key 
actors, locales, and pathways for an influx of arms. These operations must identify key 
seaports, airports, or other transportation/shipping pathways that support the group, state, 
or region. Further, these operations must identify and gain access to key actors such as 
transportation personnel (pilots, cargo handlers, financiers, customs officials, etc…). 
These actors may be located at the destination, the source, or intermediate locations – 
requiring a geographically dispersed collection effort. The intelligence collection step is 
the most demanding task of countering illicit brokering. At present, the U.S. may have 
limited resources to devote to intelligence collection and analysis on the arms trade 
problem, given the priority of resources and effort given to counterterrorism. 
Consequently, the U.S. may need to consider leveraging relationships with partner 
nations’ intelligence and law enforcement organizations. 
Next, attack the brokering network. In the preceding chapter I identified several 
strategies for network attack (attack the nodes, attack the links, attack the purpose, or 
isolate the network). The appropriate strategy will depend on several considerations 
including (but not limited to) the available intelligence, the operational context or 
environment, and the potential impact. Anti-brokering operations depend on the amount 
and quality of information that is collected on a given brokering network - how well we 
can “see” the brokering network. For example, collection efforts may only identify cargo 
handlers, and not brokers. Attacking (arrest, capture, kill) cargo handlers is likely to have 
less effect than attacking brokers. Legal and geographic constraints will limit who and 
how the network can be attacked. For example, arms trade actors operating in a conflict 
environment such as Iraq or Afghanistan would be subject to action by military forces, 
whereas brokers operating from “third party” or intermediary sovereign states might best 
be addressed in conjunction with the law enforcement agencies of a partner nation. 
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Consequently, a U.S. organization responsible for countering the illicit arms trade must 
have the capacity for operations in multiple environments, including existing combat 
zones, un-governed areas, sovereign territory of partner states, and “denied” areas (e.g., 
the sovereign territory of states that reject cooperation with the U.S.). This consideration 
will be addressed in the “means” portion of this chapter. 
 There may be a necessary balance between the urgency of “attacks” on the 
brokering network with the operational need to collect more intelligence on the network. 
More information may improve the effectiveness of a network attack, by allowing better 
targeting of network actors. The goal of an operation should be to prevent any further 
weapons transfers – not just to seize or interdict specific shipments. Effectively 
disrupting the brokering network requires a flexible approach that balances these 
considerations.  
Lastly, exploit the information gained to target arms trade actors for further 
intelligence operations or direct action. Each step in this process/ method invokes 
informational and resource requirements – the means of the strategy. 
D. MEANS (RESOURCES) 
The process of disrupting the arms brokering network requires specific resources. 
The “ends” and “ways” reveal the following critical resource requirements: 
Basic Resource Requirements for Anti-Brokering: 
1. Intelligence collection and analysis 
2. Operational capability (Military, Law Enforcement, or other) 
3. Planning and coordination: inter-agency and inter-governmental 
The nature of trans-national arms trafficking requires the ability to collect 
intelligence, conduct “counter-network” operations, and plan and coordinate operations 
internationally. The process for attacking the brokering network, as outlined above, 
requires close “interagency” coordination between supporting intelligence agencies, law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs), the Department of Defense (if U.S. military forces or 
combat zones are involved), the State Department (if international coordination is 
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required), and partner nations (intelligence, military, and LEAs). The potential 
organizational complexity of the anti-brokering operations presents a significant 
challenge, a constraint that would be exacerbated if the U.S. attempted to re-organize, 
“re-invent,” or invent new governmental capacity to handle the problem. Consequently, 
this section considers the use of existing U.S. capabilities and argues that the Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are 
uniquely positioned to meet the resource requirements to conduct an anti-brokering 
strategy. 
Using SOF for anti-brokering is compelling because it uses existing U.S. capacity, 
rather than requiring creation of a new capability. Also, several distinct characteristics of 
U.S. SOF make USSOCOM the appropriate lead agency for disrupting the illicit arms 
trade through a strategy of attacking the brokering network. First, there is a precedent for 
global SOF operations against illicit networks. SOF has been employed to counter the 
drug trade in South America and terrorist networks in the Middle East and East Asia. 
Through these operations, SOF has gained the necessary experience and capability to 
conduct globally distributed operations including intelligence collection and analysis, 
direct action, and indirect efforts. In the conduct of these precedent-setting counter-drug 
and counter-terrorist operations, SOF demonstrated the capability to operate successfully 
in complex conflict and non-conflict environments that required detailed inter-agency 
coordination. Moreover, SOF are trained and organized to conduct operations in 
conjunction with partner nation governmental agencies (military and non-military) and 
surrogate forces. SOF meets the organizational requirements of a counter-brokering 
strategy through its unique combination of functional capabilities, liaison and 
coordination capacity, and experience. SOF possesses these capabilities precisely because 
of the unique requirements of special operations. 
Second, a critical component of the SOF’s existing strategy purpose is conflict 
prevention through the indirect approach. SOF conducts a series of activities in concert 
with partner nations to reduce the threat and impact of conflict, notably the use of U.S. 
Army Special Forces to prepare partner nations security forces against internal threats 
(“foreign internal defense”). The anti-brokering strategy is wholly consistent with the 
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concept of conflict shaping or prevention, by isolating groups or states from the source of 
arms that enables and intensifies conflict.  
Lastly, SOF is the nation’s force of choice for irregular conflict. Today’s irregular 
threat to U.S. security is generally non-hierarchical networked organizations that are free 
of geographic or political boundaries and affiliations. These groups transcend of 
traditional concepts of law and national sovereignty that restrict effective governmental 
responses.167 The glaring implication of this definition of the strategic threat is that 
traditional methods, to include conventional military responses, are wholly inadequate. 
We need to employ U.S. capabilities that can successfully “operate in the world as it 
exists.”168 The strategic context requires a new or alternative approach, a condition that 
uniquely favors SOF as the strategic alternative. USSOCOM, in the Irregular Warfare 
Joint Operating Concept, identifies the illicit arms trade as a key supporting activity of 
terrorism and irregular warfare. USSOCOM is the primary agency responsible for 
managing the threat presented by irregular warfare. The illicit arms trade fuels intra-state 
and irregular war, and SOF is the military proponent for protecting U.S. interests in these 
conflicts. The point is that SOF is appropriate for arms disruption based on its capabilities 
and for the fact that USSOCOM has named itself as the responsible agency for this 
strategy. 
E. CONSTRAINTS AND RISK 
The use of U.S. power to execute a new strategy (countering the illicit arms trade) 
invokes risk and involves overcoming constraints. This section identifies the primary 
risks and constraints, but does not attempt comprehensive identification of all factors 
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U.S. power in the contemporary strategic environment and provides a framework for 
types of constraints: operational, organizational, legal, and moral limitations to use of 
U.S. military power.169  
From a broad perspective, the primary constraint holding back an arms disruption 
strategy is the general failure of the U.S. to develop and implement strategies to confront 
the set of transnational/non-state threats that characterize the the post-Cold War, post-
”9/11” strategic environment. This general failure frames the absence or incoherence of 
efforts to counter arms trafficking. The ambiguity of trans-national and non-state threats 
constrains the U.S. because of traditional legal conditions for use of military power.170 
Even at a superficial level of analysis, the nature of these irregular threats necessitates 
innovative and nuanced strategic responses. To act against irregular threats by employing 
SOF, the U.S. may need to adopt a new set of considerations for employing U.S. forces – 
when, how, and why combating irregular threats by SOF is appropriate. The U.S. should 
be able to develop innovative methods of employing SOF that do not violate traditional 
constraints. For example, transnational threats strain our state-based system by making it 
hard to act without violating a state’s sovereignty. SOF operate efficiently by developing 
habitual relationships with international partners, enabling action against transnational or 
non-state actors inside a partner’s sovereign territory. 
Operational risks of an arms disruption strategy include establishing lofty 
objectives and resource management. First, there is a great risk associated with attempts 
to pursue new or overly ambitious objectives. The current U.S. policy on illicit arms 
trafficking is certainly the result of multiple influences, such as domestic-politics, 
domestic interest groups (e.g., the arms industry), U.S. governmental bureaucracy, 
international politics, and related foreign policy. It is important the approach 
recommended here is both consistent with current policy and intended to be applied to 
specific conflict areas or states – both for the purpose of avoiding the barriers that might 
rise up in from of more aggressive policy recommendations. Furthermore, it is unlikely 
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that any U.S. effort will unilaterally stop the arms trade (just as U.S. efforts to encourage 
international regulation of the arms market have had shortfalls). Pursuing global 
objectives against complex global problems, such as “ending” the illicit arms trade 
through U.S. policy and action, is likely to produce exorbitant costs and is unlikely to 
meet expectations. However, the U.S. can judiciously choose limited objectives and 
expect to impact specific parts of the arms trade. 
Second, tasking SOF to counter illicit arms brokering risks the misuse or overuse 
of a precious strategic resource. The risk is the “opportunity cost” of employing a 
relatively scarce asset, which becomes unavailable for other strategic purposes when 
committed to a strategic/operational task. U.S. SOF is currently central to the U.S.’s 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), actively involved in supporting U.S. objectives in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflict environs. The GWOT consumes much of the U.S. 
strategic resources and is the central focus of the nation’s current security strategy. 
Unfortunately, the GWOT only addresses a few of the many irregular threats posed to the 
United States. The D.O.D.’s current Capstone Concept for Joint Operations identifies 
three potential threats to U.S. security and interests: transnational threats, regional threats 
(or near-peer, emerging state), and failed/failing state threats.171 Keeping SOF focused 
solely on the GWOT neglects the remaining suite of threats and activities (including the 
countering illicit arms trade) that SOF is responsible for under the IWJOC. While use of 
SOF against illicit brokering does mean adding another task to the already large mission 
of USSOCOM, there is a compelling logic for using SOF against irregular threats such as 
illicit brokering – a role that is the purpose and strategic responsibility of 
SOF/USSOCOM. 
An additional constraint is the well-established U.S. aversion to employing SOF 
to the full extent of their capabilities. This institutional reluctance presents a significant 
organizational constraint to employing a counter-brokering strategy by SOF. Schultz 
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identifies nine impediments to use SOF in the current strategic context.172 Schultz’ 
assessment reveals that the organizational culture of the DOD is sufficient to prevent use 
of SOF. First, the distinction between conflict and non-conflict problems constrains 
military leaders from developing military solutions to non-conflict problems. As 
transnational and non-state threats often occur in the non-conflict category, DOD 
strategists and leaders are reluctant to use military force for these problems. The pre-
GWOT definition of terrorism as a law enforcement problem exemplifies the issue: by 
identifying terrorism as a police problem, the military avoided its role in countering 
terrorism. A similar problem may arise if the DOD views the arms trade as a police or 
regulation problem: while law enforcement agencies are useful and effective against arms 
trafficking, military force has an appropriate role through the employment of SOF. 
Secondly, legal boundaries often affect SOF-appropriate problems in the current 
environment. While SOF provides the DOD a military capability for clandestine and 
covert operations, the conventionally oriented DOD is reluctant to make the appropriate 
adjustments to overcome the authority problem presented by U.S. Code.173 These 
constraints can be overcome, but require strategic vision for SOF employment in the 
current environment. The point is that the internal bureaucratic barriers will likely 
continue to constrain the use of SOF against arms brokering networks. 
Legal and moral concerns may be the lowest hurdles to conducting an anti-
brokering strategy with SOF. While legal concerns are primarily about jurisdiction and 
sovereignty, moral reservations are generally concerned with how force is used. First, 
there are clear moral and legal precedents for use of force in combat zones and 
ungoverned areas. This basis justifies the use of SOF against arms brokers in these areas. 
Second, in non-conflict environments or within the territory of sovereign states, the U.S. 
can work in conjunction with partner-nation intelligence and law enforcement agencies to 
act against arms brokers – and would be required to act in accordance with laws and 
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norms of the host nation, thus alleviating the moral concern of extra-legal activities by 
the U.S. in a foreign state. Collaborating with other nations to counter the illicit arms 
trade alleviates the legal and moral restrictions that normally prevent operations by U.S. 
forces in these states. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter presents a “way” to satisfy U.S. interests and policy, given the 
resources available today and the model of the illicit arms trade presented earlier. The 
illicit arms trade “problem” is global and poorly understood, with little empirical 
“evidence” available to guide strategy. While fighting the a global illicit trade is probably 
not feasible, this chapter recommends a limited objective to disrupt the trade as it affects 
specific states, groups, or regions, that are relevant to U.S. security interests. To meet that 
objective, a process of intelligence collection and counter-network operations is 
appropriate. The chapter recommends the employment of Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) to counter the illicit trafficking of small arms. The U.S.’ existing SOF capabilities 
are sufficient to handle the task and alleviate the need to invent or re-organize national 
security assets to handle the small arms problem. SOF, as a strategic resource, balances 
the objective (a policy recommendation) and the ways required to disrupt the arms trade. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate the illicit small arms trade and to 
identify strategies for the U.S. to successfully disrupt the trade in the Middle East. Arms 
trafficking is a significant problem that is likely to increase in relevance as the U.S.’ 
adversaries turn to asymmetric forms of conflict. Terrorists and insurgents, non-state 
groups who rely on illicit arms markets to satisfy their demand for arms, prosecute 
irregular wars and internal conflicts. This demand for arms is likely to persist with the 
root causes or motivations for war and conflict. 
Illicit arms trafficking networks feed irregular wars with arms. The flow of arms 
to specific countries, regions, or groups generally requires external or transnational arms 
transfers coordinated by arms brokers. The external flow of arms is particularly important 
to the Middle East, a region that lacks sufficient internal arms production capacity to 
satisfy the demand generated by the region’s chronic instability and near constant state of 
armed conflict. Arms brokers coordinate arms deals and operate “brokering networks” 
that consist of a small numbers of actors with specialized skills, such as financiers and 
transport agents. These networks are motivated by profit, rely on trust, and operate 
specifically to avoid governmental regulation of their activities. As such, brokers are the 
central and decisive figures in arms trafficking.  
A. FINDINGS 
This thesis evaluated three potential U.S. strategies for disrupting the flow of arms 
to specific groups, states, or regions. Chapter IV compares the available options, 
including regulating the supply of arms, countering the demand for arms, and countering 
the brokering network that delivers arms. This thesis argues that regulation is necessary, 
but insufficient to reduce arms trafficking. Countering the demand for arms is not likely 
to be feasible. First, small arms are cheap and ubiquitous – making violence a cheap 
option for non-state actors. Second, the demand for arms reflects the role of arms as 
essential instruments in conflict. As long as the root causes of conflict persist, so will the 
demand for this “necessary ingredient” of conflict. In contrast to regulation or counter-
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demand, countering arms brokers provides an opportunity to disrupt arms trafficking. 
Brokers are a nearly ideal target as profit-motivated central actors with a specialized skill 
sets. Brokers are essential to the trade and the coordinate actors who (in the absence of 
the brokers’ specialized skills) are otherwise incapable of arms trafficking. The arrest or 
death of active arms brokers is likely to be a significant blow to the groups and states 
reliant upon brokers’ services. 
This thesis develops a strategy consisting of ends, ways, and means for disruption 
of arms trafficking by countering arms brokers. First, the limited objective of the U.S. 
should be to disrupt the illicit flow of small arms to specific groups, states, or regions. 
Adopting a limited objective recognizes the potential resource strain associated with 
global problems like arms trafficking. Combating arms trafficking is consistent with 
current U.S. policy and military doctrinal concepts, but specific and effective methods are 
currently lacking – hence the current reliance on policy and diplomacy for arms 
trafficking that feeds violent conflict. Second, the “ways” include an intelligence-driven 
process of targeting arms brokers. Arms brokering is an international, geographically-
disperse problem. The U.S. must be prepared to devote intelligence and operational 
resources to the task and to match the problem with an international network, often 
working with partner nations. Third, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) offer an 
appropriate “means” for conducting counter-brokering operations. SOF have a 
demonstrated capability to lead combined (international) and interagency operations with 
global reach. SOF including existing U.S. organizations with capabilities that are well 
suited to countering arms trafficking. In the counter-brokering role, SOF offer a “way” 
for the U.S. to counter the flow of arms to groups or areas of interest. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The essence of this thesis is that countering arms trafficking offers a way for the 
U.S. to shape or influence current and future conflicts. The root causes of state and non-
state warfare are complex and the resultant wars are extremely costly and dangerous. 
Targeting arms brokers offers the U.S. a way to reduce the strategic burden of Middle 
Eastern conflicts by reducing the supply of arms – the instruments that intensify conflict. 
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Unfortunately, scant research and open-source intelligence explores the complex 
relationships between brokers, weapons, and conflict. The small arms problem should be 
further researched for greater understanding of these relationships, but in the absence of 
more information, I can make the following recommendations. 
Recommendation 1. Continue the current U.S. policy on arms trafficking by 
promoting national and international regulation of the arms trade. The U.S. should 
continue to encourage partner nations and the international community to regulate the 
production and sale of arms as a necessary control in the arms market. This pro-
regulation stance is the diplomatic component of a strategy to counter arms trafficking. 
Current regulation is incomplete, with enormous disparities between states that leave 
some regions (the Middle East) nearly completely unregulated. The lack of uniform 
international regulation leaves opportunities for illicit arms traffickers to operate. While a 
pro-regulation policy is generally useful in the long-term effort against arms trafficking, 
it is unlikely to be useful as a tool against specific groups and states.  
Recommendation 2. Target arms brokers and their networks. In order to reduce 
the flow of arms to adversaries and conflict zones, the U.S. must look beyond the conflict 
and target the external support mechanisms that feed wars. Countering arms brokering is 
an external (non-occupational) or indirect method of managing conflict. Targeting arms 
brokers (and the networks they coordinate) offers a “way” for the U.S. to isolate 
adversaries from these critical external resources. This strategy cannot be accomplished 
by simple embargoes and border controls, but must include intelligence operations and 
special operations to identify, find, and interdict brokers wherever they operate. Arms 
trafficking is part of a broad set of global-irregular problems including transnational 
crime, terrorism, and insurgency. Just as the U.S. has expanded the role of special 
operations forces (SOF) to counter drug traffickers in South American and transnational 






Countering illicit arms trafficking and brokering is important to U.S. security 
interests, but there are certainly broader implications of this strategy. First, the U.S. 
should consider the relationship between the enormous U.S. defense industry and black 
markets for arms. The U.S. is a leading producer and exporter of arms globally and to the 
Middle East specifically. The nation relied on gray and black markets to support our 
allies (and counter our adversaries) during the Cold War and there are certainly rational 
reasons to covertly arm allies. Although this consideration has been beyond the scope of 
the analysis presented in this thesis, the U.S. must consider the policy implications of 
new anti-trafficking efforts on the U.S.’s freedom of action (ability to use covert/gray 
arms transfers in support of national interests). As the largest arms exporter, the U.S. may 
be supporting the arms trade “infrastructure” that arms traffickers exploit. This thesis 
recommends targeting the brokers/networks supporting specific groups/states, but our 
adversaries’ arms brokers are likely to be connected to (or at least part of) a larger arms 
market that the U.S. relies on for private commerce and foreign policy. 
Secondly, the U.S. should consider the relationship between small arms 
trafficking and weapons proliferation more generally. Among the nation’s highest 
priorities is countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
associated materials or technology. While there is no obvious connection between small 
arms traffickers and the WMD, arms traffickers may offer their capacity to coordinate 
sales and transport to groups seeking WMD. In fact, traffickers may be able to “scale-up” 
their operations for the higher profit that WMD-trafficking would undoubtedly offer. 
There may be a single system of illicit arms trafficking that moves all forms of weaponry 
from small arms to nuclear weapons. U.S. counter-proliferation efforts focus on WMD 
materials, and in doing so may ignore the connections between small arms traffickers and 
the movement of much more lethal weapons. Consider that recent media reporting has 
described the potential ease of WMD movement from former Soviet states to the Middle 
 77
East by a seemingly low-level network of traders, smugglers, and criminals.174 The U.S. 
should evaluate the potential gains or losses in effectiveness in adopting a broader 
counter-proliferation strategy that potentially includes all forms of weaponry. 
In additions to these political and strategic implications, the small arms problem 
offers numerous areas for future research. On the supply side, emerging technologies may 
play a role in combating arms trafficking in the future, such as proposals to tag weapons 
with traceable electronic devices. These measures would greatly enhance the ability to 
gather intelligence and track arms transfers. Furthermore, this analysis largely discounts 
the usefulness of counter-demand strategies (i.e., how to get groups to not seek arms). 
Technological developments may enable the production of arms or ammunition that 
“deny” or “deter” weapons use by specific groups. For example, ammunition designed to 
fail (destroying the weapon or injuring the user) could be covertly introduced into 
conflict areas to deter use of specific weapons. Technological developments may offer 
many innovative solutions to the small arms problem. 
D. REMARKS 
To conclude, the illicit trafficking of small arms affects U.S. interests profoundly 
by introducing weapons to conflict zones and to groups seeking violent solutions. One 
strategy to combat arms trafficking is to target arms brokers and the networks that 
brokers operate. The complexity and lack of understanding of the small arms problem 
contrasts with the simplicity of small arms – cheap, ubiquitous instruments of war. This 
thesis offers a way forward for reducing the flow of arms to specific groups and states, 
but further research is needed to better understand this problem. 
                                                 
174 William Langweische, “How to Get a Nuclear Bomb,” The Atlantic Monthly (2006), 
http://www.theatlantic.com (accessed August 20, 2007). 
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